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William A. Ingram

# MILITARY INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY.

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# MILITARY INFLUENCE ON NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

by

William A. Ingram

Submitted to the
Faculty of the School of International Service
of The American University
in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree
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MASTER OF ARTS

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The importance of the military influence on national security policy is easily recognized but not always understood. Often the significance of the military influence is distorted because it is not observed in the proper overall perspective of national security policy formulation and implementation. This thesis is an attempt to integrate the military element into the policy process by observing the overall influence relationship. In order to provide the proper perspective, the military influence is observed in its societal and institutional environment as well as noting means for influence effectuation. In addition to describing and analyzing the military influence, an effort is made to find a proper military role within the national security policy process.

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# CHAPTER I

## INTRODUCTION

Since the end of World War II, there has been an increasing amount of debate and concern over the military's role in national security policy. The controversy over "unification," the dismissal of General MacArthur, and continuing public policy conflicts between the Administration and the Armed Services are only the surface manifestations of the underlying problem of an unclear delineation of military responsibility and position in the policy process. The nature of the security threat and the scope and intricacy of the policy process requires that the roles of participants be recognized and evaluated in their true perspective in order that the overall problem of national security may be better understood.

Unfortunately, most of the attention given the military role has considered only narrow aspects of the overall military influence or has been heavily weighted with bias, emotionalism, or sensationalism. While the efforts of Congress in structuring an effective security organization or the various scholarly attempts to identify and evaluate specific areas of military influence have contributed to a better understanding of the security process, few works have been offered which specifically relate to overall

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military involvement in national security policy. On the other hand, there have been attempts to deny the military any but the most narrow participation in the policy process or to insist that military involvement be broadened to a point which might seriously endanger the nation's political structure. Positive efforts to find a responsible solution through reason and compromise are often overshadowed by the sensationalism which the alarmists and extremists employ.

The purpose of this paper is to attempt to cast military influence in its proper perspective within the overall security process. Conscious effort will be maintained to provide objectivity. Both sides of specific positions will be presented in most instances; however, the scope of the subject necessarily restricts the coverage to a survey and all areas and arguments cannot be presented in detail.

The second limitation imposed on the study concerns the definition of the term "military." Unless otherwise specified, military will refer to the military officer corps and will be restricted to those officers on active duty or retired officers who are functioning in an immediate post-retirement status. This limitation is necessary to differentiate between the <u>military</u> influence and the influence of the <u>militarists</u>. The latter group includes civilians as well as military personalities and wields a

military involvement in national security policy. On the other hand, there have been attempts to deny the military any but the most narrow participation in the policy process or to insist that military involvement be broadened to a point which might seriously endanger the nation's political structure. Positive efforts to find a responsible solution through reason and compromise are often overshadowed by the sensationalism which the alarmists and extremists employ.

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considerably greater political influence than the officer corps of the various services. The line between military and militarist influence is sometimes indistinguishable and some situations will be omitted because sufficient doubt exists to orient properly a valid analysis. Other cases, where determination of the boundaries of influence is arbitrarily drawn, will be included because they are necessary to the overall perspective.

The study is necessarily limited by data availability. All research materials were restricted to documents and books generally available to the public. The information which rests in the classified files of the various Government agencies might cast considerably greater light on the subject of military influence; however, the study proceeds upon the assumption that any dramatic difference between the reflected image and actual practice could not long escape the public's attention because of intense political interest in the matter.

The development of the survey requires coverage of forces acting on the military role as well as a presentation of military influence itself. Therefore, Chapter II is designed to provide an insight into societal features acting on the military role. Later chapters will cover the factors which have contributed to the expanded military role. This part of the discussion is limited to the most

pertient characteristics of the traditional civilian-military relationship and specifically covers civilian-military distrust, military professionalism and social isolation, and the civilian supremacy concept. The rest of Chapter II provides the basis for expanded military power by describing some of the factors which encouraged, or at least failed to restrict, military influence in the policy process.

Chapter III is concerned with the national security organization and the institutional atmosphere in which the military operates. The unification conflict is covered both to indicate the degree of influence of the various services as well as to provide an understanding of contemporary conflict among the services. The remainder of the chapter describes the "National Security Act of 1947," the security policy organization, and something of the emerging role of the Department of Defense.

The following chapter deals with specific military involvement in the policy process. This discussion attempts not only to cite degrees of involvement but also to indicate why the military are motivated to enter the various areas. Military influence in policy planning, implementation, and domestic affairs are analyzed on the basis of military expertise, policy coordination, policy representation, and general effects on society.

Chapter V provides an analysis of military influence means and the problems of limiting the military role. Special emphasis is placed on the relation of the individual aspects of the military role to the formulation of an appropriate role in the overall national security process.

Whenever possible, the study relies on primary source materials in the form of Congressional hearings, diaries, public papers, and Government directives. Other sources, except those works chosen to reflect extreme viewpoints, have been selected on the basis of objectivity, recognized authoritativeness, or logically-constructed arguments.

## CHAPTER II

## THE EXPANSION OF THE MILITARY ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

> In the 14 years since the end of World War II the traditional distinction between peace and war has been obliterated by a contest which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on world communism by expediency. The competition is total--it is military, economic, scientific, political, diplomatic, cultural, and moral.[1]

This description of the "cold war" was certainly applicable in 1960. While taking into consideration the subsequent tenor of the East-West competition which has led some students of international relations to disclaim the validity of the cold war concept,[2] the practical aspects of an anti-communist conflict still dominates the realities of United States security planning.[3] The character of the

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[1]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Interim report made by its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1.

[2]J. William Fulbright, Old Myths and New Realities (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 8-9; and Charles O. Lerche, Jr. and Abdul A. Said, Concepts of International Politics (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), p. 223. There is an increasing discourse on the obsolescence of the "cold war" concept, but few relevant substitutes have been forwarded to describe the present East-West relations.

[3]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Forces and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the

# CHAPTER 12

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In the 15 years since the end of World War II the traditional distinction between peace and war has been obliterated by a conflict which knows no boundaries and no limits except those imposed on world communism by expediency. The competition is total—it is military, economic, scientific, political, diplomatic, cultural, and moral.[1]

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continuing conflict between East and West has been the greatest contributor to the evolutionary process which has affected the nature and extent of military influence in the formulation and implementation of United States security policy.

At the termination of World War II, the military influence in national and international affairs had reached its zenith. This was caused by the nation's total mobilization in order to gain its military objective of unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany. For the first time in history, America had placed all its resources on the line, and great effort had been required to coordinate and integrate military and civilian contributions. The task of coordination was under the overall direction of military leaders.[4] In fact, the military leadership was given such a free hand in the direction of the overall war effort that it has been reported that Presidential authority in the form of decision reversal was only exerted on two occasions.[5]

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Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., on S.2950, February 23-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 15-19.

[4]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on S.758, March 18-May 9, 1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 25.

[5]Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military

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At the culmination of World War II, the military influence in national and international affairs had reached its zenith. This was caused by the nation's total mobilization in order to gain its military objective of unconditional surrender of Japan and Germany. For the first time in history, America had placed all its resources at the disposal of what effort had been required to consolidate and integrate military and civilian contributions. The task of coordination was under the overall direction of military leaders.[4] In fact, the military leadership was given a free hand in the direction of the overall war effort that it has been reported that Presidential authority in the form of declaration power was only exerted on two occasions.[5]

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Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., on S.1250, February 7-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 12-13.

Yet, as soon as the war had been successfully concluded, the position and influence of military leaders rapidly diminished as political leadership reasserted itself.

The period of peace, in the traditional sense, was soon over. The development of the cold war brought back the atmosphere of crisis in which military influence flourishes. Yet, other forces were at work, which were destined to change the character and direction of military influence in national security policy. The traditional civilian-military relationship would be reinforced through legislation. Rapid advances in technology and new concepts of diplomacy were to present new problems to which United States security policy would have to adjust.

## I. TRADITIONAL CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

Some of the earliest political writings relating to the founding of the United States expressed the ambivalent attitude of Americans toward military influence. Alexander Hamilton wrote of the fear of a standing Army for the new republic and how this fear interfered with the necessity for security and strength.[6] As a check on military

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Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 19-20.

[6]Alexander Hamilton et al., The Federalist (New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, Inc., 1948), pp. 115-119.

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## 3. MULTIPOLAR CIVILIAN-MILITARY RELATIONSHIP

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influence, the Constitution explicity divided control of the Army between Congress and the President of the United States. In spite of a continuing concern, the American people have supported military forces to carry out policies and have seen fit to bestow the highest honors on military figures.

The traditional civilian-military relationship has, therefore, been a mixture of distrust and honor and of fear and respect. The position assumed, at any one time, has depended upon conditions and atmosphere.[7] And the relationship has not been a one-sided affair inasmuch as the military has had occasion to exhibit the same emotional responses as the civilian.

Civilian-Military Distrust

Initially, civilian distrust of the military showed a fear that the armed forces would assume an active political role. After all, as Finer points out, assumption of the military willingly avoiding politics is not a "natural" condition. "Instead of asking why the military engage in politics," he states, "we ought surely to ask why they ever

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[7]Burton Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 2-3.

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The traditional civilian-military relationship has, therefore, been a mixture of anxiety and broad support. The position assumed, at any one time, has depended upon conditions and circumstance.[7] And the relationship has not been a one-sided affair inasmuch as the military has been occasion to exhibit the same emotional responses as the civilian.

Civilian-Military Rapport

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[7] Burton Klein and Richard C. Lugar, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 2-3.

do otherwise."[8] Yet, the fear of overt political actions, such as an attempt to gain civil power, have never presented a serious threat to United States democratic government.

Civilian fears and distrust of the military were reflected during the postwar period in several ways. During the conflict over the military's policy favoring a large standing army, the opposition to Universal Military Training generally adopted the stance that UMT would lead to a garrison state and the end of democratic government.[9] Other fears of military influence concerned the threat of seeking military solutions to political problems.[10] The most current source of distrust has been the so-called military industrial coalition for political power. The latter fear gained credence from the extent of defense expenditures and the prestigious office of the President who made the allegation.[11]

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[8]Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 4-5.

[9]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Training Corps Act, Hearings, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., on S.2441, February 7-14, 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 223, 233, 244, 385, 399, and 533. Testimony in opposition to UMT was broadly based, representing Churches, labor, farmers, and private pacifist organizations, and the theme of opposition was generally the spectre of militarism.

[10]Fulbright, op. cit., p. 116; and John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 145.

[11]Harry H. Ranson, "Department of Defense: Unity or

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[8]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), pp. 1-3.

[9]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Training Corps Act, Hearing, 82d Cong., 2d sess., on S. 1621, February 7-13, 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 223, 234, 244, 288, 298, and 329. Testimony in opposition to CMT was broadly based, representing churches, labor, farmers, and private political organizations, and the views of opposition was generally the objects of militarism.

[10]Hitchcock, op. cit., p. 115; and John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 183.

[11]Dulty N. Hanson, "Impeachment of Defense: Duty or

Military leaders, on the other hand, developed a distrust for civilians, specifically those involved with defense strategy. This distrust and contempt was generated by the feeling that the civilian civil servant was indecisive,[12] that the civilian leadership was ready to give up victories won on the battlefield,[13] and that civilian strategists were not knowledgeable enough to rule on military matters.[14]

Numerous examples of mutual distrust between the civilian-military communities could be quoted. However, the single incident which best reflects the ambiguity that shrouds the issues is the various interpretations of the influx of military personnel into the State Department at the end of World War II. One viewpoint was that the

---

Confederation"; and Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," American Defense Policy, eds. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 168 and 186. Several other writers have attached even greater significance, perhaps more than is warranted, on President Eisenhower's remarks on the Military-Industrial complex and its impact on American Society.

[12]James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), p. 166.

[13]Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), pp. 152-153.

[14]Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," op. cit., p. 189.

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[12] James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1958), p. 69.

[13] Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 113-133.

[14] Huntington, "Power, Expertise and the Military Profession," op. cit., p. 788.

military were spreading their influence and political power base by infiltrating the foreign policy organ of the government.[15] At the same time, the recruitment of military officers by the State Department brought an unfavorable reaction from General Norstad, Air Force member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The General felt "considerable misgivings about the extent of military participation in diplomatic decisions" which the practice might cause and further believed that the appointments were not in the best interests of the military establishment because it might be, in due course, attacked "as exercising too powerful an influence on our foreign policy."[16]

The source of the civilian distrust of the military originated in the distance which separates the military community from the general public and the civilian policy makers. The military's desire for isolation and the development of professionalism gave rise to one of the least understood concepts which plague military-civilian relations--the concept of the "military mind."

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[15] Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 5-6. It should be noted that the more radical viewpoint, as expressed by Professor Swomley in his book, The Military Establishment, takes the stand that the military influx into the State Department in 1946 was a conscious infiltration to spread militarism.

[16] Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 315-316.

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[16] Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 313-316.

Military Professionalism and Social Isolation

In order to understand the relationship of the military to the state and to their functions in the national security policy process, the character and attitudes of the officer corps should be studied. According to Huntington, it is the officer corps which is "the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society."[17] In addition, the emergence of military officers as an important leadership group has been noted as an element of modern American society.[18]

The recognition of the officer corps' position and influence within society should have led to an exacting study of this group. However, one study of the military role has determined that "far too little is known about the history of the armed forces, military policy and the relations of the military to national policy-making in the United States."[19] This would appear to indicate that the

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[17]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 3.

[18]Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 6.

[19]Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder, and H. W. Bruck, An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note (Princeton: Princeton University Organizational Behavioral Section, July, 1954), p. 8.

Military professionalism and social isolation

In order to understand the relationship of the military to the media and to their functions in the national security policy process, the character and attitudes of the officer corps should be examined. According to Huntington, it is the officer corps which is "the active directing element of the military structure and is responsible for the military security of society."[17] In addition, the emergence of military officers as an important leadership group has been cited as an element of modern American society.[18] The recognition of the officer corps' position and influence within society should have led to an examination of this group. However, the study of the military role has determined that "far too little is known about the history or the armed forces, military policy and the relations of the military to national policy-making in the United States."[19] This would appear to indicate that the

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[17] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 8.

[18] Morris Janowitz and Roger W. Little, Sociology and the Military Establishment (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1965), p. 9.

[19] Lawrence Radway, Foreword to Edwin H. Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), p. 8.

role of the military prior to World War II was not significant enough to attract the attention of political scientists.

The military officer corps incorporates the prerequisites of a pressure group. In fact, Finder finds that the military possess those qualities which make pressure groups most influential--centralized command, hierarchy, discipline, intercommunication, esprit de corps, and a corresponding isolation and self-sufficiency.[20] Yet, the military have one primary difference from the normal pressure group. This difference consists of a sincere correlation of the group interest with the national interest. This does not necessarily mean that the military believe that what is good for the armed forces is good for the nation but rather that "the officer has a responsibility to society because of his particular expertise of violence management."[21]

The difference between violence management and participation in the act of violence provided the key to professionalism. Even with today's rapidly-changing technology soldiers and sailors can be trained in a relatively-short scope of time to function as fighters. However, the

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[20]Finer, op. cit., p. 7.

[21]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

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professional officer must be trained over a long period of time and participate in many different fields of study. To understand his profession, the officer must have some idea of its relation to history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology, as well as mastering some aspects of the physical sciences. "Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine," Huntington states, "it is now almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer."[22] The obvious goal of the wide area of training is to provide the expertise in strategic and operational planning required of the nation's military leadership.

The development of expertise and professionalism, coupled with the ever-present civilian distrust of the military, tended to isolate the military officer corps from the civilian community. The character of military service with its frequent transfers of personnel and operational requirements that personnel be billeted close to their assignments further divided the two communities. The end result has been that the military, at many bases, attend their own churches, schools, and recreational facilities, and can be completely separated from the civilian community if they so desire. The extent of the social isolation is

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[22] Ibid., p. 14.

professional officer must be trained over a long period of time and participate in many different fields of study. To understand his profession, the officer must have some idea of its relation to industry, politics, economics, sociology, the psychology, or well as mastering some aspects of the physical sciences. Just as a general education has become the prerequisite for entry into the professions of law and medicine," Huntington states, "it is now almost universally recognized as a desirable qualification for the professional officer."[12] The obvious goal of the wide area of training is to provide the expertise in strategic and operational planning required of the nation's military leadership.

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[12] Ibid., p. 12.

clearly reflected by an article in The Washington Post which reported a Military Debutante Ball. The list of those girls presented, as well as significant guests, were all part of the military society; and even the music was furnished by military musicians.[23]

The nature of professionalism and its corresponding professional and social isolation were contributing factors to civilian-military distrust. Yet, this factor of distrust would not be of much significance to the national security policy process except that it undoubtedly contributes to the construction of the concept of the "military mind." Most writers on military policy or the role of the military in national defense policy state that some aspect of policy is the result of or colored by the military mind. Even though many writers liberally utilize the concept either in defense of the military role or in a derogatory manner, few have developed the validity of the imagery. This situation was described in one study of the military role by the statement that:

> There has been a good deal written about the "military mind," some of it by responsible and knowledgeable observers and scholars. Much of this literature has been characterized by certain doubts and fears about the nature and limitations of military thinking. However . . . it must be said that

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[23]News item in The Washington Post, December 30, 1966.

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> none of the writers who have dealt with it have done very much to clarify or to develop the concept. The "military mind" has been for the most part an impressionalistic notion rather than an analytic concept. It is also true, perhaps inevitably, that there has been little if any systematic scientific investigation of the motivation of career military officers.[24]

Regardless of the concept's validity, it has been widely accepted and, therefore, must be considered in reaching an understanding of the interaction of forces which affect the military's influence in policy formulation. If civilian participants in the policy-making process attribute military advice and recommendations to qualities of the "military mind," the prestige and influence of the military professional decreases and his function more or less reverts to tactician rather than strategist. Therefore, some popularly-accepted characteristics of the military mind should be reviewed.

A study made in 1954 gathered the following "typical" characteristics and interpretations of stereotyped military thinking: uncreative in thought and problem analysis because it relies on tradition rather than benefiting from recent experience; inability to understand and relate politico-military relationships or to give adequate weight to non-military factors; approaches most social issues and

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[24] Sapin et al., An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note, op. cit., p. 24.

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[24]Harold Stein et al., An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making, a research paper, cit., p. 32.

situations in an authoritarian manner and has little respect or regard for civilian authority; thought is based on a narrow military scope and the mind is insulated from non-military knowledge; and the seeking of military solutions to all problems whether military or not.[25]

Finer was more charitable in that he attributed the traits of courage, discipline, self-sacrifice, and patriotism to the character of the soldier.[26] On the other hand, some writers have gone to the extreme of accusing the military of being warmongers and completely lacking in personal or professional integrity. Such was the case with Swomley when he accused the military of prefabricating the intelligence report that cited the imminent danger of a communist conquest of Europe in 1948. The report was used by President Truman as a basis for asking for Universal Military Training and the Marshall Plan. Swomley also intimated that the U-2 incident of May 1960 was planned by the military to wreck chances for peace by breaking up the summit conference.[27]

Most of the alleged traditional or typical characteristics of the military mind do not correspond with the

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[25] Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 20.

[26] Finer, op. cit., p. 11.

[27] Swomley, op. cit., pp. 64-65 and 110.

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[25]Japan and Anyone, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 10.

[26]Finer, op. cit., p. 14.

[27]Bowman, op. cit., pp. 14-15 and 19.

realities of contemporary military thought or that exhibited in the past twenty years. This is not to imply that the military mind does not exist, but only that the separation of the civilian-military communities and the actions of a few military officers have been permitted to distort the concept of the military mind. The distortion becomes readily apparent when one attempts to match narrow concepts to the actions and thoughts of the most prominent military men of the past twenty years. These would include: General George C. Marshall, who originated the plan for Europe's economic recovery and, subsequently, won a Nobel Peace prize;[28] General MacArthur's concern for the economic and political aspects of postwar Japanese government which he so skillfully developed while serving as the military governor there;[29] Generals Eisenhower and Bradley, who preached that the military must have a deep concern for the civilian economy while they were Army Chiefs of Staff;[30] General Ridgeway's opposition to involvement in the French Viet Nam struggle in 1954 for politico-economic reasons as well as

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[28] Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 6.

[29] Caraley, op. cit., p. 177.

[30] Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 366-367.

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[29] Eagle and Eagle, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, pp. 217-18.

[30] Cordier, op. cit., p. 177.

[31] General Lyautey, Speeches to the French Army (1922), pp. 328-347.

military limitations;[31] and General Taylor, whose "unconventional" military thinking led to his recall from retirement to become President Kennedy's Chief of Joint Chiefs of Staff.[32]

Huntington, who must be considered one of the leading scholars on military behavior, probably comes closest to a relevant concept in his analysis of military thinking. He states that:

> This responsibility /as protectors of the state/ leads the military: (1) to view the state as the basic unit of political organization; (2) to stress the continuing nature of threats to the military security of the state and the continuing likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize the magnitude and immediacy of the security threats; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces; (5) to oppose the extension of state commitments and involvement of the state in war except when victory is certain.[33]

This explanation of the "military mind" appears more valid than the popular concept because it generally covers the actions of military officers while acting in their official capacity as advisers on national security policy formulation. At the same time, the concept recognizes the

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[31]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Goblentz, Duel at the Brink (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960), pp. 116-120.

[32]Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 259.

[33]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pp. 64-65.

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Huntington, who must be considered one of the leading theorists on military behavior, probably comes closest to a fleshed concept in his analysis of military thinking. He argues that

> this responsibility [to preserve the security of the state] leads the military: (1) to view the state as the basis unit of political organization; (2) to stress the overriding nature of threats to the military security of the state and the dominating likelihood of war; (3) to emphasize his magnitude and immediacy of the necessity threaten; (4) to favor the maintenance of strong, diverse, and ready military forces; (5) to oppose the extinction of state ownership and involvement of the state in war except when clearly to be overt.[33]

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[31] Maxwell Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet, (New York: Harper and Bros., 1959), pp. 144-150.

[32] Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 429.

[33] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pp. 84-85.

fact that men, even the military officer corps, base their thinking on preconceived values shaped by environment and the ability to reason. Therefore, rather than a "military mind," the concept should encompass the plural, "military minds," which differs not only between the different branches of the armed forces but also within the various parts of the individual services. Thus, for instance, one could expect to find a different trend of thought in the naval aviator, surface line officer, staff corps, etc. However, some degree of uniform condition can probably be expected from the common military factors such as discipline, professionalism, corporate self-interest, patriotism, etc.[34] "A general does not always think exclusively as a general might be expected to," explains Brodie when relating the military's concern for non-military problems, "one reason being that he is a man with a distinctive personal history as well as being a general."[35]

The concept or misconcept of the military mind also leads to the inevitable fear of too great a military influence in national policy. This fear is generally expressed in terms of the dangers of militarism or garrison state.

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[34]Sapin et al., An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note, op. cit., pp. 31-32.

[35]Brodie, op. cit., p. 367.

in terms of the function of military or quasi-mili-
tary force in national policy. This fact is generally acknowl-
edged by the intelligible fact we use phrase a military solu-
tion or military force. The question or relationship must then
clearly be set in terms of a means.[32]

The question of relationship of the military means to
the political ends, or objectives, has been the subject of
many books and articles. Some of the more well known are
Clausewitz, On War; Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect
Approach; Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age; Earle, Makers
of Modern Strategy; Wolfers, Discord and Collaboration; Mor-
genthau, Politics Among Nations; Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons
and Foreign Policy; Osgood, Limited War; Schelling, The Strat-
egy of Conflict; Snyder, Deterrence and Defense; Wright, The
Study of War; Knorr, Military Power and Foreign Policy; Ar-
nold, Wolfers, et al, Alliance Policy in the Cold War; Ar-
nold, Wolfers, et al, Military Power and Collective Security;
Furniss, Jr., Atlantic Bridge; Furniss, Jr., Western Security;
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Furniss, Jr., Military Power and Foreign Policy; Furniss,
Jr., Military Power and Foreign Policy; Furniss, Jr., Mili-
tary Power and Foreign Policy; Furniss, Jr., Military Power
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There can be little doubt that this idea affects policy makers, especially in view of the changing role of the military in the policy process and the cooperation and coordination required of the civilian-military leadership to forge a relevant and effective policy.[36]

Civilian Supremacy Concept

Civilian supremacy over the military was a prime concern of the founding fathers of the United States. Explicit powers to control any military political threat were provided to both Congress and the President. And therein lies much of the problem confronting the civilian supremacy concept. Civilian supremacy is assured only when the authority and responsibility for military policy and action resides in the civilian political leadership. By dividing responsibility between the executive and legislative branches, the struggle between Presidential control and Congressional control was encouraged. The proponents of Presidential control charge that the legislature lacks sufficient organization and is too cumbersome to effectuate proper control and direction of the military forces. On the other hand, Congress feels that it more closely reflects the will of the people and is not as susceptible to becoming

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[36]Sapin et al., An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note, op. cit., p. 23.

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Civilian supremacy over the military was a prime concern of the founding fathers as the following [illegible] powers to control any military political threat were provided to both Congress and the Executive. And thereby like most of the peculiar constraints and division of powers, civilian supremacy is assured only when the authority and responsibility for military policy and action resides in the civilian political institutions. By dividing responsibilities between the executive and legislative branches, the struggle between Presidential control and Congressional control was encouraged. The peculiarity of Presidential control rests with the legislature lacks sufficient organization and is too cumbersome to effectively oversee control and direction of the military forces. On the other hand, Congress feels that it more closely reflects the will of the people and is not as susceptible to [illegible]

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[16]Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (New York: The Free Press, 1960), p. 418.

a prisoner of military advisers as is the President.[37] Huntington further finds that objective civilian control, control by a single governmental element, best minimizes military political power through greater professionalization of the military officer corps.[38] Thus, the military would not be encouraged to play the executive branch against the legislative arm of government with its resultant politicalization of the military. Finer takes exception to this idea of enforcing civilian supremacy. "The reason is that the very nature of professionalism on which Huntington sets such store and which he regards as politically sterile, in fact," Finer argues, "often thrusts the military into collision with civil authorities." This happens because the military's consciousness of themselves may persuade them that their responsibility is to the state rather than the government in power through contrasting the national community as a continuing corporation with temporary incumbents in control. Also, as specialists in their field, the military may feel that they alone are competent to deal with "pure" military matters.[39]

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[37]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 81.

[38]Ibid., p. 84.

[39]Finer, op. cit., pp. 25-27.

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[37] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 81.

[38] Ibid., p. 84.

[39] Finer, op. cit., pp. 23-27.

There has been some evidence to support Finer's conclusions. Perhaps the best known and most explicit examples of this argument were the two following statements by General MacArthur:

> For example, I find in existence a new and heretofore unknown and dangerous concept that the members of our armed forces owe primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the authority of the executive branch of government, rather than to the country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.
>
> No proposition could be more dangerous. None could cast greater doubt upon the integrity of the armed forces.[40]
>
> We of the military shall always do what we are told to do, but if this nation is to survive, we must trust the soldier once our statesmen have failed to preserve the peace . . . . We must proclaim again and again and again an invincible adherence to the proposition that in war there can be no substitute for victory.[41]

In spite of the weight which was attached to such views because of MacArthur's tremendous prestige and popularity, the primary danger of a failure of civilian supremacy in national security policy formulation lies not in direct political intervention or confrontation by the

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[40] Rovere and Schlesinger, op. cit., p. 315. Reprint of MacArthur's address before the Massachusetts Legislature in Boston, July 25, 1951.

[41] Varin E. Whan, Jr. (ed.), A Soldier Speaks, Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army, Douglas MacArthur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1965), pp. 301-303. MacArthur's Founder's Day address at the Military Academy, March 14, 1953.

There has been some evidence to support Finer's conclusion. Perhaps the best known and most explicit examples of this argument were the two following statements by General MacArthur:

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military but rather in the more subtle form of loss by forfeiture of authority and responsibility on the part of civilian leaders. This loss can be effected by failure to recognize the roles of the military in policy formulation, by fear of assuming responsibility for decisions contrary to military advice or recommendation, and the civilian leadership becoming "militarized."[42]

The dilemma faced in the quest for civilian supremacy has undoubtedly affected the ability of both the civilian and military components of the national policy-making team in coping adequately with the complex problems of security. One example of the problem has been apparent in the organization aspects of policy formulation. Consistently, studies of military organizations have criticized the Joint Chiefs of Staff as inefficient and ineffective. Yet, attempts to correct these deficiencies have been opposed on the basis that it will lead to the development of a "Prussian-type general staff."[43]

Even though much fear has been expressed of the expanded military role in national policy, domestic as well as foreign, all indications point to the fact that civilian

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[42]Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

[43]Ibid., p. 2.

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The dilemma facing in the quest for civilian supremacy has unquestionably affected the ability of both the civilian and military components of the national policy-making team in coping adequately with the complex problems of security. One example of the problem has been apparent in the reconstruction aspects of policy formulation. Consistently, studies of military organizations have criticized the State Department as being as inefficient and ineffective. Why, attempts to correct these deficiencies have been opposed on the basis that it will lead to the development of a Prussian-type general staff.[43]

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[42] Hagan and Bowers, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

[43] Ibid., p. 2.

supremacy is increasing rather than diminishing. This trend has been noted in the increasing scope of the Presidential Office at the top of the national defense organization,[44] in the increased powers of the Secretary of Defense,[45] by remarks of President Eisenhower,[46] and by the increased importance of other non-military departments and agencies in the policy-making process.

Robert A. Lovett, writing in 1962 for the benefit of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Armed Forces, exhibited the disdain which many experienced civilian leaders have for the fear of loss of civilian supremacy. He noted the irritation between military and civilian agencies which happens at times, but, on the specific subject of subordination to civilian control, he wrote:

> Official and personal relations between the military and civilians . . . seem good, judging by the moderate number of times one reads that tired old story about "restoring civilian control." Alarmist cries about the lack of control over the

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[44] Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1965), p. 16.

[45] The increased powers of the Secretary of Defense are explicitly covered by the "National Security Act of 1947" and will be treated in detail in Chapter III.

[46] News item in The New York Times, February 3, 1955. The President commented that the ultimate decision responsibility was his regardless of military views or concern relating to national policy.

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Albert W. Levis, writing in 1950 for the Security of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the House Committee on Armed Forces, published the dilemma which many independent civilian leaders have for the fear of loss of civilian supremacy. He noted the correlation between military and civilian agencies which happens as time, but, in the specific problems of mobilization to civilian control, he wrote:

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> military, in our Nation, deal with a strawman issue. They are concerned with a problem which does not really exist, and they are divisive and damaging by falsely implying that the military does not accept our historic tradition of civilian supremacy. Nothing could be more wrong.[47]

The preceding discussion was designed to provide an understanding of the nature of the societal atmosphere through which the military officer corps has been conditioned and in which it effectuates its influence. If the civilian-military attitudes and characteristics appear somewhat disordered, it is the result of the confusion in societal doctrine which has seen the emergence of militarized civilians and civilianized military.[48] As a result of this phenomenon, some scholars have seen fit to say:

> It is quite possible that United States foreign policy could be overbalanced toward military objectives or the use of military techniques without this necessarily being a result of Military Establishment thinking or influence. It is interesting to note that oftentimes some members of Congress are more prone to argue for quick, military solutions of problems than the high ranking officers who testify before their committees.[49]

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[47]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security: Selected Papers, Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 142-143.

[48]Gene M. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," Components of Defense Policy, ed. Davis B. Bobrow (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), p. 113.

[49]Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 23.

military, in one fashion, deal with a phenomenon [illegible]. They are concerned with a problem which does not really exist, and they are directing and leading by falsely implying that the military does not accept our pluralistic tradition of civilian supremacy. Nothing could be more wrong.[43]

The preceding discussion was designed to provide an understanding of the nature of the societal atmosphere through which the military officer corps has been channeled and in which it effectuates its influence. If the civilian-military attitudes and characteristics appear somewhat disordered, it is the result of the confusion in societal doctrine which has been the [illegible] of military-based civilians and civilianized military.[44] As a result of this phenomenon, some scholars have been apt to say:

> It is quite possible that [illegible] foreign policy would be overwhelmingly toward military, either views or the use of military techniques without [illegible] basis of fallacies. It is increasingly more that professional [illegible] officers who testify before civic committees,[45]

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[43] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization of National Security, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), pp. 142-143.

[44] Cass R. Lyons, "The New Civil-Military Relations," Community of Defense Policy, ed. David B. Robertson (Chicago and McNally and Company, 1962), p. 113.

[45] Edgar and Brown, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 13.

Regardless of conditioning factors, the fact remains that, prior to World War II, the influence of the military in national policy formulation was negligible. Subsequent discussion will be directed toward those factors which caused military influence or presence to generate concern, rightly or not, for its control.

## II. POSTWAR PERSPECTIVES AND NEW MILITARY HORIZONS

Fortunately, from the viewpoint of the researcher, very little controversy surrounds the reasons why military activity and influence increased in the formulation and implementation of national security policy since the end of World War II. These reasons can be summarized as follows: The United States recognized the need to assume a major role in world politics and this role involved a substantial and continuing threat to the nation's military security; the traditional importance of military weaponry was increased manifold by revolutionary advances in the technology of war; and the interdependence of military and political policy required greater concern for policy coordination.[50]

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[50] Sapin et al., An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note, op. cit., p. 1.

dependence on conventional factors, the Iraqi regime that, despite its tactic use of it, the influence of the military in national policy formulation was negligible. Nonetheless discussion will be directed toward those factors which caused military influence or dynamic elsewhere, slightly or not, for its control.

## II. POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE NUCLEAR QUESTION

Fortunately, from the viewpoint of the researcher, very little controversy surrounds the capacity of military activity and influence incurred in the formulation and implementation of national security policy since the end of World War II. Three reasons can be suggested to explain the limited consideration the need to assume a major role in world politics and civilian's military economic and coordinating chores as the nation's military the traditional importance of military measures increased amplified by revolutionary advances in the technology of war, and the interdependence of military and political policy required genuine concern for policy coordination."[3]

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[3]Amos A. Jordan et al., The National Security Policy in American Crucible (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 13.

American World Position

At the termination of World War II, the United States was faced with the decision between withdrawing behind her traditional isolationalism or taking an active part in world affairs. The latter course was determined to be necessary in the interest of the nation's security. Because of the war's effect, Europe and Asia were in a devastated condition and, therefore, the decision to take part in world affairs was, in effect, a decision to assume leadership of the free world in the struggle against communism.

The nature of the communist threat was both political and military. The policy chosen by the United States was to deter further Soviet expansion in any area of the world with primary emphasis being placed on Europe. The accomplishment of this task was recognized as impossible on a unilateral basis and led to the alliance system which exists to the present. The alliance system had both economical and military significance. The economical aspects were exemplified by the Marshall Plan; however, there were military overtures running through all the economic programs. In some cases, economic aid was directly attached to military objectives, as in the Mutual Defense Assistance Act under which sixteen hundred shiploads of military equipment had been delivered to Europe by June, 1951. In other

American foreign relations

cases, such as the Marshall Plan, the pure economic aid was designed to return the participating nations' economies to a point where those nations could better support their own defense.[51]

The primary decision to expand the political role of the United States inevitably led to greater military influence in the nation's security policy. The ability of any nation to influence or effect change in the international environment must be, in the end, proportionate to its relative capabilities.[52] Since the possibility or probability of armed conflict was an ever-present part of the "cold war," the military capability of the United States became an important, and at times the most significant, factor in American foreign policy. When General Marshall was Secretary of Defense, he emphatically denied that the military initiated foreign policy; but, at the same time, he admitted that the Joint Chiefs of Staff influenced foreign policy because they had to determine whether the armed forces could execute those policies proposed by the State Department. He further said that, when State Department

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[51]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Mutual Security Act of 1952, Hearings, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., on S.3086, May 8-13, 1952 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1952), pp. 12, 35, 38, and 70.

[52]Lerche, op. cit., p. 48.

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[51]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Mutual Security Act of 1957, Hearings, 85d Cong., 1st Sess., on S.1088, May 8-13, 1957 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1957), pp. 12, 35, 38, and 70.

[52]Lerche, op. cit., p. 68.

proposals were made, the military checked to insure that they could implement the proposed policy without weakening our security posture or without placing the nation in a dangerous position in relation to potential enemies.[53]

The expanded role of the military was not restricted to military capability analysis, a function recognized as within the purview of military expertise. The military became involved in political and economic problems which were directly and indirectly connected to military capabilities. Generals became military governors of Germany and Japan. Admirals initiated and negotiated treaties regarding bases in Spain and were active in intra-governmental negotiations concerning the status of islands captured from the Japanese in World War II. And the Pentagon actively opposed a unilateral peace treaty with Japan until 1950.[54]

The assumption of a leading role in world affairs caused the blurring of foreign and domestic policy priorities and goals in the name of national survival. This led to increased military influence being felt in domestic policy. The choice open to decision makers in the determination of domestic policy was narrowed by the requirement

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[53] U.S. News and World Report, April 13, 1951, p. 30.

[54] Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 33-34.

nation of domestic policy was determined by the requirements of increased military influence being felt in domestic politics. The choice open to decision makers in the determination of foreign and domestic policy priorities and goals in the name of national security." This led to increased military influence being felt in domestic politics, the choice open to decision makers in the determination of domestic policy was determined by the requirements

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[23] T.E. Evans and David Kenney, April 19, 1971, p. 30.

[24] Kaplan and Bowker, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, pp. 218, 10-12.

to maintain a strong military capability. The determination of military adequacy was and continues to be primarily the responsibility of military leadership. Therefore, the choice of weapons, manpower requirements, and supporting facilities affected the economic, political, and social life of the nation.

Technological Advancements

The technological revolution which followed World War II contributed to the increase of military influence in several ways. Quantum jumps in the development of weapons capable of mass destruction increased reliance on the experts who must use the weapons. At the same time, the costs of weapon production and increased expertise required for utilization place a greater burden on the national economy. The development of new weapons also complicated traditional tactical and strategic concepts because the effectiveness of the weapons and weapons systems had not been tested except under laboratory conditions. The latter point become especially significant when one realizes that national military strategy must be formulated on the basis of unproven weapons and their effects on the overall coordination of military weapons.[55]

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[55]Washington Center of Foreign Policy Research, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 116-122.

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[5]Washington Center of Foreign Policy Seminar, "Developments in Military Technology and Their Impact on United States Strategy and Foreign Policy," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 119-123.

While technological advancements, especially the balancing of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, have often been cited as destroying the validity of the concept of war as another political device, it appears that this phenomenon has not actually developed. The so-called "balance of terror" did not prevent the war in Korea, or Viet Nam. It has not worked to prevent the "wars of national liberation." Aside from the fact that it works to prevent an all-out general war by establishing a prohibitive cost/risk ratio on all states, the development of a nuclear stalemate would actually seem to encourage "bush" wars because it is in the national interest of the great powers to prevent general escalation. Under this concept, the cost/risk ratio improves in most underdeveloped nations, and those which have the least to gain from order and political stability become potential war zones. The military's influence in national policy has traditionally increased during periods of crisis; therefore, if one accepts the concept that mutual nuclear deterrence heightens world tensions and encourages limited war, an inevitable increase of military influence must be expected.

Policy Vacuum

The formulation of national security policy has always been a weak feature of the United States Government.

This can be partly explained by the division of policy-making function between the executive and legislative branches,[56] by the pre-World War II concept of natural defense, by isolation, and by the lack of experience in world affairs.[57] Other explanations involve the characteristics of policy making in the democratic political system and the vast complexities of world politics.

Perhaps the best explanation of United States weakness in security policy stems from a combination of factors; however, the most obvious and direct cause of policy weakness following World War II stemmed from the fact that the State Department was not staffed nor oriented toward foreign policy based on United States world leadership. Huntington has pointed out that throughout World War II the Department of State "continued to believe that its function was diplomacy and that diplomacy was distinct from force."[58]

The conservative role of the State Department during and after World War II may have been affected by the fact that the department lost many of its young officers to the military services. This, coupled with a policy of

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[56]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 140.

[57]Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 100, 106-107.

[58]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 321.

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[38]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the
Political Process," American Defense Policy, pp. 222-
100.

[39]Robert A. Osgood, "The American Approach to War,"
American Defense Policy, pp. cit., pp. 102-107.

[40]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, pp. cit.,
p. 111.

non-recruitment, left the department both understaffed and tradition oriented.[59] The prestige of the State Department was further depreciated by the security scandals in the postwar era, and this factor further weakened the department's ability to participate effectively in the policy-making process. Not only did security leaks make Congress reluctant to give strong support to the State Department, but it also became a negative factor in the recruitment of able personnel.[60]

As the Russian threat became more apparent, policy makers turned more to the Department of Defense for advice and policy formulation. Additionally, in the attempt to rebuild the Foreign Service with the "Manpower Act of 1946," military personnel were recruited directly into the State Department.[61] Thus, military influence increased because this element of the policy-making team was ready to fill the vacuum created by the lack of vigorous policy formulation within the State Department.

Part of the increase of military influence in foreign affairs was the result of the State Department's

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[59]The American Assembly, The Representation of the United States Abroad (New York: Columbia University, 1956), p. 15.

[60]Stanley, op. cit., pp. 39-41.

[61]The American Assembly, op. cit., pp. 16-17.

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refusal to accept operational functions at the end of World War II. As an example, the Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, resisted accepting operational responsibility for the occupation of Germany on the assumption that it would hinder the Department's ability to conduct foreign policy.[62]

The lack of clear-cut and vigorous foreign policy also placed military commanders in the field in a significant position to affect the nation's security policy. Such cases as that concerning a China policy following the surrender of Japan were not uncommon in the postwar era. In the case of China, the issue was clouded by two weak and opposing policies in the State Department. In the hopes of making the correct decision, the policy makers asked General Wedemeyer to advise a course of action. The General replied that this was a problem which should be handled in the State Department, but he did offer his evaluation of the situation.[63] Another example of the lack of clear-cut policy and resultant military influence was reflected by the confusion which MacArthur's Formosan trip caused in Washington in late 1950. W. Averell Harriman was dispatched to Tokyo by the President to brief General MacArthur on American policy.[64] When one considers that the incident

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[62]Stanley, op. cit., p. 38.

[63]Millis, op. cit., pp. 110-111.

[64]Rovere, op. cit., pp. 126-127.

reflected a case in which a general with broad military command, the Pacific theater, was not fully conversant with the objectives and goals of American national security policy, it must be conceded that, if clear-cut policy existed, those with a need to know were being excluded from the policy dissemination process.

## III. INTERDEPENDENCE OF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY AND MILITARY POLICY

In the preceding discussion, the interdependence of national security policy and military policy has been implied or stated on many occasions. Yet, the actual significance of this interdependence to an expanding military influence in security policy has not been directly related. There would be little concern for a wider military role in national security policy if the fear did not exist that such a role would have a detrimental effect on the overall security of the United States and its form of democratic government. Those who share the concern of militarization of national policy project its effects on national goals and interests and reject the idea that the military should participate in the security policy process beyond advising policy makers in purely military matters.

### Wide Policy Implications

Hardly any political action can be contemplated

without careful analysis of its effect on national security. This is especially significant when world politics are involved, but since World War II, broad domestic political actions have required the same careful evaluation. Because the military occupy key positions in the direct or indirect implementation of foreign policy, most policy proposals must be carefully coordinated between the Departments of State and Defense.

The coordination of security policy and military policy has not been a traditional aspect of American Government. In a memorandum to President Roosevelt in 1937, Assistant Secretary of War Louis Johnson decried the lack of coordination when he wrote:

> I find this action of the State Department, in ignoring military advice, has been characteristic of its attitude for many years past. My investigation discloses that this is an attitude not assumed by the foreign office of any other nation. On the contrary, none embarks upon foreign policy having any military implications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of the responsible military authorities. May I respectfully ask that you consider directing the Secretary of State to afford an opportunity to the War Department to express its views upon all matters having a military implication, immediate or remote.[65]

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[65] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 553.

viduals' courtesy analysis of the effect on national security. This is especially significant when world politics are involved, but since World War II, second domestic political actions have captured the same careful evaluation. Because the military possess key positions in the effort to maintain implementation of foreign policy, most policy formulators must be cognizant concerning factors for employments of space and defense.

The coordination of security policy and military policy has not been a traditional aspect of American government. In a memorandum to President Truman dated the 13th Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy [illegible] lack of coordination when he wrote:

> I find this action of the State Department, in imparting military advice, has been characteristic of the attitude for many years past. By investigation directors that this is an attitude not assumed by the foreign offices of any other nations. In the country, does impair free foreign policy having any military implications without giving the fullest consideration to the advice of the responsible military authorities. May I respectfully ask that you counsel directing the Secretary of State to afford an opportunity to the War Department to express its views upon all matters having a military implication, [illegible] practice."[65]

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[65]Dayton Stokes Computer, Jacobs, Committee on Government Operations, Reorganization of National Security, hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and Operations, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., June 23, 1965 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1965), p. 353.

The coordination of national security policy became absolutely necessary in the postwar era, and the process of policy coordination must be recognized as one means through which military influence has increased. The process of coordination implies consultation and cooperation; therefore, the military voice became known in councils which had been closed previously. The best-known council for coordination of security policy open to the military influence has been the National Security Council. While not a participating member, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was accorded the right to sit in on all sessions in an advisory capacity and indirect participation of the military was assured by the membership of the Secretary of Defense.

When President Eisenhower determined that an additional organization was necessary to coordinate security policy, he initiated the National Security Council Planning Board. Here again, military representation was effected through assignment of the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as advisers.[66]

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[66]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security: Selected Materials, prepared for the Committee on Government Operations and its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 11-13.

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policy coordination must be developed to the maximum advantage
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ordination implied [illegible] the coordination between
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[5]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Reorganization for National Security: Selected Committee Reports, Reprinted for the Committee on Armed Services [illegible], 86th Cong., 1st Sess., Committee Print [illegible] Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 11-13.

The Military Assistance Program of 1949 increased the scope of military activity abroad. While the overall control of the program was assigned to the Ambassador in the affected country, the actual direction of the program was the function of a senior military officer who was also to act as an adviser to the ambassador. This program also saw the assignment of military personnel to overseas posts to advise foreign military staffs in initating and developing requests for aid, training in the use of newly-acquired United States military equipment, and observing the end use of aid. In the political area, military officers were charged:

> 1. To advise the U.S. Ambassador on special political considerations involved in MAP matters.
>
> 2. To make political analysis and to report on such matters of political implication relating to MAP.
>
> 3. To assist in the developing of country requests for aid by reviewing and advising from the political point of view.[67]

The military received representation in the functioning of the Economics Cooperation Administration because it was responsible for proper administration of military end items and for coordinating the military aspects of production

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[67]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination: A Study, Submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 53-54.

the military assistance Program of 1950 increased the scope of military activity abroad. While the overall control of the program was assigned to the Department of the Treasury, the actual direction of the program was the function of a special military office that also had to act as an adviser to the Ambassador. This situation gave the Department of Military Assistance [illegible] to advise foreign military chiefs in initiating and coordinating requests for aid, bearing in mind the use of country-oriented United States military equipment, and generally to see one of aim. In the political area, military officers were charged:

1. To advise the U.S. Ambassador on general political considerations important to aid matters;

2. To make political analysis and to report on such matters of political importance relating to aid;

3. To assist in the development of country programs for aid by carrying and advising from the political point of view.[1]

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[1] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Organization and the Problem of Coordination: A Study, Together with Views of Members of National Security Training and Operations, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1953), pp. 33-34.

programs in foreign countries. This representation and responsibility were formalized in 1951 by a joint memorandum of understanding between the Departments of State and Defense and the Economic Cooperation Administration.[68]

The Brookings Institution, in a report prepared for the Bureau of the Budget in 1951, found that the number of civilians working for military agencies overseas had increased from 500 in 1939 to the staggering sum of 51,204 by 1950. At the same time, the total number of civilians employed by 18 other government agencies had increased from 4,500 to 23,675.[69] The number of civilians employed by military agencies was primarily a reflection of the vast number of American troops maintained in Europe. But it must be recognized that military commanders of these troops had an active influence role in the implementation of security if not in its formulation.

These were only a few of the developments following World War II which required a greater degree of coordination for the planning and implementation of defense policy. Other significant areas included the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Organization of American States, the Disarmament Commission, the Atomic

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[68] Ibid., pp. 59-61.

[69] Ibid., pp. 78-79.

Energy Commission, and many other agencies through which the military increased their influence in national security policy either through direct representation or in a consultative or advisory role.

Security Planning Against Time

The time factor cannot be ignored in national policy. It became a significant aspect of policy planning because an effective policy must depend on continuity as well as flexibility and on future capability analysis as well as present status. Just as the State Department provides policy continuity of a diplomatic variety, the military leadership of the Department of Defense provides military policy continuity. Additionally, the military gathers military intelligence and evaluates both present and future military capabilities on which national survival may depend.

Continuity of national security policy depends, to a great degree, on military leadership because the civilian political leadership is subject to frequent change. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff may undergo a similar change in the case of a new political leadership, the Joint Staff and other participants to the military policy-making process act as a secretariat for policy continuity. Also, the expense involved in changing military posture requires that the military leadership endorse, or at the very least not

Security Planning Against Time

The time factor cannot be ignored in national policy. It becomes a significant aspect of policy planning because an effective policy must depend on continuity as well as flexibility and on future capability analysis as well as present status. Just as the high degree of policy uncertainty of a diplomatic variety, the military inadequacy of the Department of Defense provides military policy continuity. Traditionally, the military services have inevitably and unalterably been present and future military capabilities on which national survival may depend. Continuity of national security policy depends, to a great degree, on military leadership because the civilian political leadership is subject to frequent change. While the basic tools of itself may accompany a similar change in the mass of a new political leadership, the basic thrust and other participants in the military policy-making process act as a constraint for policy continuity. Also, the weapons involved in changing military doctrine create that military inadequacy, or at the very least not

actively oppose, a change in posture in order for the administration to gain Congressional approval for its actions. Examples of these aspects of continuity can be seen in the Eisenhower Administration's retention of its policy of massive retaliation or "new look" because a majority of the Joint Chiefs either supported the policy or would not officially oppose the administration. Without active support for the Army's proposed policy of "flexible response," there was no way of inducing either Congress or the administration to provide additional funds to strengthen the Army's ability to fight limited wars.[70]

Quantum jumps in military technology have also provided a basis for increased military influence in national security policy. The military can make a persuasive argument that more money should be spent or more resources allocated to research and development on the basis that, if the idea of a new weapon is feasible to this nation's military leaders, potential enemies will gain a future superiority unless immediate work is commenced. The need for maintaining constant preparedness gave the military leadership a strong influence over weapons development and procurement. The fact that there is a time lag of from five to ten

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[70]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), pp. 41 and 45-46.

[illegible]

years from weapon planning to the developed product often leads to waste in the form of unusuable products. However, such waste has been generally accepted because the alternate to more research and development has been the possibility of losing weapons superiority.

National Interest Versus Corporate Interest

Another factor which increased military influence on national security policy was the corporate interest of the individual armed services and the military officer corps as a whole. Finer notes that "the military are especially well equipped or placed to plea the national interest to obtain their goals."[71] This observation appears especially applicable to the United States armed forces following World War II. The unification controversy found all sides using the national interest argument for their own purposes. And the final result of the "National Security Act of 1947," before amendments, was to imply that the national interest would be served best by giving the military a greater voice in national security policy.

The corporate interest of the armed forces is directly concerned with matters relating to national security. In this respect, the various services are concerned with their portion of the budget and broad military policies.

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[71]Finer, op. cit., p. 33.

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[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

The services are individually and collectively concerned with pay, promotion, retirement, housing, medical care, and other corporate interest matters. In their efforts to bring about favorable legislation, they have reacted much like other pressure groups.[72] It is not surprising that during the "lean" years of reduced military budgets that the military expanded its efforts to affect legislation favorable to the corporate interest, but contacts with legislators and interested third parties were of similar value in increasing military influence in national security policy. The growth of military legislative offices since the end of World War II is a clear indication of the usefulness of a military lobby on Capitol Hill. The corporate interest aspect of military lobbying was described by Raymond:

> The high point of the military lobby activities comes when the chiefs and their aides appear before the committees to answer questions. Some of these questions are carefully planted in advance with favorite and cooperative Congressmen. Others are anticipated. The answers are given as "personal opinions" to avoid the suggestion of insubordination if they are in conflict with administrative policy. But they are candidly intended to influence legislation. Thus the Air Force carries on its campaigns for bombers, and the Navy fights for its carriers and the Army for modern equipment, despite powerful efforts by succeeding administrations to keep expenditures down. Much of the testimony is public and carefully phased to advance service viewpoints.[73]

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[72] Raymond, op. cit., p. 202.

[73] Ibid., p. 203.

The period following the Second World War has definitely seen a change in the traditional civilian-military relationship with regard to national security policy. The prewar role of the military as a passive actor in the national policy process gave way to an active military influence in many aspects of domestic and foreign policy. The change was conditioned by the crisis atmosphere of the cold war and has reached sufficient proportions to cause an increasing concern for the survival of American democracy. Yet, the old civilian-military distrust has been brought forward during the period when the complexities of national security demand an ever closer coordination and cooperation between the civilian-military policy-making team.

The next chapter will describe some of the problems of military influence in the organizational efforts to coordinate national security. These will primarily revolve around the unification conflict and the resulting unification act. In addition, the present organization of the Department of Defense will be described in order that the institutional framework through which military influence is exerted can be better understood.

# CHAPTER III

## ORGANIZING FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

> In enacting this legislation, it is the intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the security of the United States; to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to the national security; to provide a Department of Defense . . . .[1]

Looking at the National Security Act of 1947 in retrospect, one cannot easily understand the magnitude of the controversy which surrounded its passage. Today, institutionalization of military unification is an accepted fact and principle. The size of the national defense budget alone is sufficient reason for coordinating military economic planning. Yet, the most important concern of military unification necessarily revolves around national security policy. The military must be involved in national strategy based directly or indirectly on the military power of the nation. Strategic planning must be a continuous and coordinated process, otherwise military power has little meaning and its utility as a political device cannot be

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[1]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act of 1947 as Amended through September 20, 1966, Committee Print, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1. Hereafter referred to as National Security Act of 1947.

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realized.[2] Why then the bitter controversy over unification?

The obvious need for unified war planning brought about the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II. General George C. Marshall, a member of the Joint Chiefs, saw the need for permanent institutionalization of the unified strategy concept. His early efforts to achieve this goal evolved slowly and against formidable opposition into the "National Security Act of 1947."[3] However, it was not the concept of unified planning which became of paramount importance to either those who favored or those who opposed military unification. In fact, Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal cited a need "for the planned integration of all the elements, energies and forces in our Nation which have to be drawn upon to wage successful war."[4] This statement was made by one of the leaders of the opposition to unification because he

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[2]Robert E. Osgood, "War and Policy," American Defense Policy, eds. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 110.

[3]Demetrios Caraley, The Politics of Military Unification (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), pp. 23-24.

[4]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Defense Establishment, Hearings, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., on S.758, March 18-May 9, 1947 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1947), p. 21. Hereafter referred to as National Defense Establishment.

realized.[3] Any time the Soviet government may publicize

them!

The obvious need for unified war planning brought

about the creation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during

World War II. General Hodges C. Marshall, a member of the

Joint Chiefs, was the head for planning implementation

plan of the United Atlantic Treaty. The early address to

Congress this year involved himself and Supreme Commander

Dwight Eisenhower [illegible] to be [illegible]. However,

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of those who opposed military unification. In fact, Secretary

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[3]Robert C. Hilpert, "The Air Policy," American Defense Policy, rev. ed., Edgar S. Furniss et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), p. 340.

[4]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 73-74.

[illegible] Defense Organization, Unified Command, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., 1958, p. 11. Hereafter referred to as Unified Command.

sincerely felt that the existing Joint Chiefs of Staff could provide unified strategy.[5]

The actual causes of the controversy surrounding military unification were too deeply seated to be solved by a single piece of legislation. The fact that several amendments to the basic law have been necessary indicates that difficulties have not been overcome to this date. In order to gain a better understanding of the present state of military influence on national security policy, some aspects of the inter-service rivalries, the conflict generated by the unification proposal and the institutionalization of a national defense organization should be covered.

## I. THE UNIFICATION CONFLICT

Conflict appears to be the only terminology applicable to the controversy which surrounded unsuccessful efforts to establish a single, supreme head of the Armed Forces. The military services placed their full resources on the line. There was direct lobbying with "interested friends" in Congress. High-ranking officers made speeches, both discreet and indiscreet, supporting the position of their individual services. News leads were a common occurrence, especially to biased reporters. And each service set up

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[5]Caraley, op. cit., pp. 118-119.

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special sections which were charged with the responsibility for providing ammunition in the war of words.[6]

After unification legislation was enacted, the conflict between services became somewhat muted. The peace was to be short lived; but, although the methods remained almost the same, the tenor of subsequent controversies were considerably quieter. There was also the phenomenon of a change in direction of the unification controversy as the Department of Defense organization evolved into a more powerful and centralized governmental mechanism. For purposes of organization, the unification controversy can be divided into three eras: the Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy-Johnson Administrations. This division roughly represents the evolution in military unification progress as well as changes in national security policy concepts.

The Truman Administration

President Truman inherited a growing demand for military unification when he took office. Although over a dozen studies had been made on this subject and some fifty-five bills or resolutions introduced under this topic since 1924, none had been a serious threat to individual service

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[6] Ibid., pp. 151 and 218-226. Professor Caraley presents a particularly good account of those methods used by the individual services to influence Congress and the public.

special exercises which were charged with the responsibility for [illegible] communications in the war of nerves."

After modification implications was enacted, the dominant between American [illegible] minds. The media was to be under fire, although the [illegible] closed the doors, for fear of [illegible] operations were considerably curtailed. There was also the development of a change in direction of the [illegible] considered, at the [illegible] of national [illegible] policy to move toward a more centralized decision-making [illegible]. The [illegible] of organization, the multiplication [illegible] and [illegible] into three units: the Bureau, Directorate, and Planning-Research [illegible]. This division completely [illegible] the motivations in military operations [illegible] as well as changes in wartime security [illegible].

The Psywar Modification

Psychiatric Warfare suffered a [illegible] [illegible] military modification when the book [illegible], although [illegible] a good [illegible] that [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] five drill or [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

autonomy.[7] The increasing sentiment for centralized direction of the Armed Forces was reflected in the Congressional hearings held in April, 1944, on a proposal to establish a single armed forces department. The House Select Committee on Postwar Military Policy found that the principle was good but that the war made it inopportune to promote legislation. The issue was revived as a result of a study made under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April, 1945, and a study known as the Eberstadt Report made at the request of Chairman Walsh of the Senate Committee on Naval Affairs in October, 1945. These were followed by President Truman's unification message of December 19, 1945, in which he urged the establishment of a single military department. In April, 1946, Senate Bill S.2044, which closely followed the President's recommendations and also incorporated much of the Eberstadt Report, was introduced in the Senate Military Affairs Committee.[8]

While S.2044 was favorably reported on May 13, 1946, from the Military Committee, representatives of the Navy Department managed through Congressional contacts to have

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[7]Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 11.

[8]National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 5-6.

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the bill referred to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee.[9] The Navy Department opposed the bill when hearings were held by this committee and sufficient influence was brought to bear to have the measure die without being reported out. This effort was followed by President Truman's action directing the service chiefs to attempt agreement on some form of unification. An agreement was reached January 16, 1946. The following month, the President transmitted to Congress a proposed bill which had the approval of the War Department, Navy Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[10]

Thus, the chronological record indicates that three years of intense effort and Presidential support was necessary to bring a bill before the Congress with a reasonable chance of passage. The influence and pressure which was exerted by all parties to the unification controversy resulted in a division of opinion which was not only limited to the military services but also permeated other governmental organizations and reached deeply into the public consciousness. The bitterness generated by the unification conflict was reflected by a statement in The New York Times that "ever since V-J Day the gloves have been discarded,

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[9] Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 121.

[10] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

the Bill embraced do the people need effective Committee."[9]

The Navy Department opposed the Bill once reaching even help by this committee and militant initiative was required to keep it from the shoals of total defeat [illegible]. This effort was initiated by President Truman's action directing the Central Staff to include agreement on some form of unification. In agreement was reached January 16, 1945. The resulting memo, the Eberstadt Recommendations to Congress a document still which had the approval of the War Department, Navy Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff."[10]

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[9]Walter Millis [ed.], The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 121.

[10]National Defense Organization, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

and what is happening on Capitol Hill is but the beginning of what will be a brass-knuckle fight to the finish."[11]

The actual conflict, prior to passage of the unification bill, had several active aspects. The most significant of these aspects was the corporate interest of the three services, the concept of civilian supremacy, and the basic disagreement over the most efficient and effective means of increasing the nation's security. Running through the texture of legitimate controversy was the clash of personalities, both within the military and among civilian supporters of the various service positions, and the personal vested interests of some segments of the Armed Forces Officer Corps.

The corporate interest of the Army was directed toward maintenance of its status as a military power during the postwar period. The Army leadership feared that under peace-time conditions that it would have to take a secondary position to the more glamorous Navy and Air Force in the division of scarce appropriations. This led to the desire for a single service secretary who would have an obligation to maintain parity between the three services. The Air Force supported the Army's goal of a single service secretary because it appeared to be the most expeditious means

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[11]News item in The New York Times, October 20, 1945.

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[11]Sam Lowe in The New York Times, October 30, 1960.

for gaining a status of equality with the Army and the Navy. The Navy opposed such an organization because it feared a coalition between the Army and Air Force, within a unified military establishment, would result in a loss of Navy prestige, flexibility and, perhaps, even their naval aviation and Marine Corps units.[12]

The aspect of corporate interest which was explicit in the unification controversy concerned the roles and missions of the individual services. It was in this area that both military and civilian leaders could actively argue for their services' interests without appearing to subordinate the national necessity of defense. Without disregarding the fact that these leaders sincerely believed that their positions were truly in the national interest, it was apparent that the bill was considerably diluted by the alterations and modifications necessary to allay fears of infringement on corporate interest of the individual services.[13] During the latter part of 1946, the service

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[12]Millis, op. cit., pp. 146-147.

[13]National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 51-52. In a letter to the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee holding hearings on unification, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal wrote: "You will recall that Senator Byrd asked me to . . . point out the provisions of S.758 which would support my statement that the bill . . . adequately safeguards the morale and autonomy of the Navy and its components, including particularly the Fleet Marine Forces and naval aviation. The provision on which I base this statement are to be found explicitly in sections

[illegible] the Army adjusted with the least [illegible]
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The Report of Subcommittee Number One included
in some unsigned documents considered the voting pro-
visions of the Truman Committee. It was in this area
that there existed the greatest [illegible] between
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subcommittee the fact that there [illegible] that
what their positions were really in the national interest,
it was evident that the bill was constantly utilized by
the [illegible] for modifications necessary to bring about
a [illegible] of [illegible] interest of the individual
services,[14] during the latter part of 1941, the service

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[13] [illegible], op. cit., pp. 141-142.

[14] Select Defense Expenditures, op. cit., pp. 31-
32. In a letter to the Chairman, by the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Navy relating suggested modifications. Secretary
of the Navy Frank Knox [illegible] this will [illegible] that [illegible]
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its components, including particularly the first marine
forces and naval aviation. The [illegible] on page 2 [illegible]
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leaders were steadily reaching a common compromise position on the administration aspects of unification. Yet, it was not until agreement was reached on the functions, roles, and missions of the individual services that official, joint War and Navy Department support was forthcoming.[14]

Part of the controversy definitely concerned the concept of civilian supremacy as applicable to the proposed single "super" Secretary and the proposed Chief of Staff. On the one hand, the argument was put forward that a single civilian Secretary would strengthen civilian direction and control of the military leaders. This idea had early support from President Truman. Secretary Forrestal recorded discussion about a combined military department on July 30, 1945, in which the President talked about destroying the "political cliques that run the Army and the Navy" and that this subject appeared to be a fixation of his.[15]

The primary argument in Congress over the civilian supremacy issue in the unification controversy was apparently subjective in nature. Those members who favored the Army-Army Air Force position generally used the argument that a single secretary would strengthen civilian supremacy

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102(a), 103, 106(a), 102(b), and 201(a)." This theme is also explicitly referred to in Secretary of War Patterson's testimony, p. 52, and in Assistant Secretary of War for Air W. Stuart Symington's prepared statement, p. 87.

[14] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

[15] Millis, op. cit., p. 88.

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1945, in which the Truxtun talked about specifically the
"political citizens that are the army for the Navy" and that
this country moreover to be a direction or six.[15]

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ally subjective in nature. Those backers who favored the
Army-Navy bill since mainly directly used the argument

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[14]National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 113-
114, 1945, 1946, 1947, and 1948. This issue is
also emphatically examined in the testimony of the Patterson's
testimony, p. 23, and in Admiral Conolly's of May 21,
1945, Senate Committee on Naval Affairs, p. 87.

[15]Millis, op. cit., p. 89.

over the military. The supporters of the Navy's position expressed considerable apprehension over the power of a super-secretary or a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In fact, Secretary Forrestal and the Navy Admirals found themselves in the unusual position of having to assure Congressmen that the 1947 bill did not provide extensive powers to the proposed Secretary of Defense.[16] Yet, there was considerable evidence to indicate that the supremacy issue, to Congress, was more concerned with who would be supreme, the President or Congress, in determination of military policy. Those Congressmen who wished to retain influence over military matters saw consolidation under a single secretary as a further weakening of Congressional control of executive branch agencies.[17]

The views of the military on a single Secretary of Defense covered several areas. In addition to the corporate interest aspect which has been previously mentioned, there was a strong desire of the top Army generals, particularly General Eisenhower, for a decisive role in strategic planning. After testifying that the unanimity system employed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff had been indecisive and slow in World War II, the General endorsed the single secretary

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[16] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 35-37, and 134-135.

[17] Caraley, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

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[illegible] the [illegible] of a challenge of the [illegible] by [illegible]
In short, Secretary Forrestal met the many complex issues
threatening to the unusual problems of creating an entire
Congressmen that new 1947 must win over powerful opponents
powers as the President necessary or otherwise,[16] [illegible] there
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[16] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 83-
87, and 134-135.

[17] Caraley, op. cit., pp. 189-190.

concept as necessary and desirable to correct this deficiency. When questioned as to the wisdom of a decision made by a non-professional who might be acting on the basis of a choice between conflicting recommendations, General Eisenhower replied: "In war, you must have decision. A bum decision is better than none. And the trouble is that when you get three, you finally get none."[18]

The matter of unified strategy and command of operations was probably one of the less controversial aspects of unification. All services supported the principle of this concept and only differed in whether they believed that the existing system provided adequate machinery to promote the principle in practice. The discussion which surrounded joint operations and planning led to initiation of the Joint Command concept which was formulated by Admiral Nimitz and General Eisenhower in August, 1946.[19] To the Navy, this plan appeared sufficient to prove that consolidation was not necessary to insure efficient military cooperation in both planning and operations.

The personal factor was a strong supplement to the more or less legitimate controversy which unification generated. The people who took part in the controversy

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[18] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., p. 113.

[19] Millis, op. cit., p. 195.

concept is necessary and desirable to correct this deficiency. When questioned as to the wisdom of a decision made by a non-professional who might be helping an Army Chaplain or a conflict between conflicting recommendations, General Clausewitz replied: "In war, you must have confidence in better than nothing. You simply get stuck."[12]

The matter of unified strategy and command as operations was primarily one of the less controversial aspects of unification. It received support from principle at this concept was only diluted in wording by half-hearted attempts to provide adequate machinery to promote the principle in practice. The discussion which surrounded joint operations and planning led to initiation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff which was fathered by Admiral Nimitz and General Eisenhower in August, 1945.[13] To the Navy, this plan appeared sufficient to permit close consultation but not necessary to insure effective military cooperation in both planning and operations.

The personal factor was a second impediment to the more or less indefinable controversy which unification

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[12] Clausewitz, _op. cit._, p. 192.

[13] Millis, _op. cit._, p. 139.

represented the top civilian and military leaders in the nation. Accusations and counter accusations made interesting news coverage; and individuals from opposing positions went out of their way to criticize and denounce the views of their opponents. The cases of personal overzealousness were numerous. It was not surprising that, in the three years prior to enactment of the bill, deep and bitter rifts developed over the issue.[20]

The time span of the conflict was causing all parties to weary of the issue. The Administration, Congress, and the public were relieved when the joint War and Navy Department endorsement of unification was announced. Hearings on the bill progressed with a minimum of explicit dissent until the Marine Corps Commandant, General Vandegrift expressed his dissatisfaction in April, 1947.[21] When this happened, a reopening of the whole controversy appeared imminent. An item in the New York Herald Tribune reflected the state of public opinion:

> General Vandegrift's insurgency has opened up a whole flood of barely repressed fears, jealousies, misunderstandings, and mental reservations in which the whole agreement, so painfully achieved, threatens to perish. These are not only service jealousies. The various congressional committees have squabbled and delayed over their respective privileges in the matter, individual statesmen have capitalized on

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[20] Caraley, op. cit., pp. 220-230.

[21] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 412-413.

> this or that divisive interest rather than aiming at the one national goal of an adequately controlled military system, and in the process the measure of agreement that was achieved has been wearing thin while the old paralyzing bitterness has been reviving in the form of more bitter still. The bill may fail, and if it does we shall be left with a military system more deeply divided, and consequently more incompetent for its mission than before.
>
> In the face of this situation it is impossible not to feel that, between the Congressmen and the services, the greatest nation in the world has been conducting its vital military affairs like a tin horn principality.[22]

Unification became a fact, albeit a weak and controversial fact, on July 26, 1947. Even though the President and the War Department were not satisfied with what was described as a Navy bill, all parties were weary of the conflict and relieved that it was finished.[23] During the rejoicing, hardly anyone noticed the true significance of the unification controversy.

The organization which was embodied in the 1947 Act provided the basis for improving the overall security posture of the nation. But, overlooked in the course of the controversy, the defense posture of the United States had been allowed to ebb to a dangerous point at the time when the Soviet threat was increasing. From the end of World War II until enactment of the "national Security Act of

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[22]Editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1947.

[23]Caraley, op. cit., p. 269.

this or that ultimate interest rather than aiming at the one national goal of an adequately coordinated military system, and in the process the treasure of agreement that was achieved has been wasting away while the old paralyzing bitterness has been growing in the form of more bitter strife. The bill may fail, and if it does we shall be left with a military apparatus far more deeply divided, and consequently more incompetent for its mission than before.

In the face of this alternative, it is inconceivable not to feel that, between the Congressmen and the servicemen, the greatest section in the world has been committing its vital military affairs like a tin horn gambler.[23]

Unification became a fact, albeit a weak and confused one, on July 26, 1947. Even though the treatment and the two Departments were not satisfied with what was described as a hazy bill, all parties were weary of the conflict and believed that it was finished.[24] During the relecting, nearly everyone noticed the new significance of the unification controversy.

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[23]Editorial in the New York Herald Tribune, May 1, 1947.

[24]Leahy, op. cit., p. 240.

1947" the services were seriously handicapped by the machinations of the controversy and the uncertainty of their future disposition. The editor of The Forrestal Diaries came to the conclusion that:

> It would be impossible to lay down any long range military plans or policies, to determine properly the size or structure of the military machine to be maintained, or to face with any consistency and forethought the underlying politico-military problems which that machine existed to meet. It is hardly too much to say that the battle over unification delayed the nation for a year or two in grappling with the already dire state of world affairs.[24]

Considering the steady deterioration of the shaky peace period following World War II, it is doubtful that the same rate of disarmament, especially in manpower, would have been undertaken by the United States if a unified national security organization had existed. As early as August, 1945, the records indicate that the military leaders foresaw the danger of demobilizing in the rapid manner ordered by the President because this would leave a power vacuum in Europe. The President made his decision for an immediate and drastic cutback of military forces on the advice of the Postmaster General and for purely domestic, partisan political reasons.[25] It is extremely doubtful that if the military advice had been developed under a

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[24] Millis, op. cit., p.153.

[25] Ibid., pp. 89-90.

1947: the services were jealously manipulated by the ambitions of the contenders and the uncertainty of their future dispositions. The author of The Defensive Tradition came to the conclusion that:

> It would be impossible to lay down any long term military plans or policies, to maintain property or the size or structure of the military services to be maintained, or to face with any consistency and intelligence the overarching politico-military problems which matter related to most. It is hardly too much to say that the battle over unification delayed the nation for a year or two in grappling with the already dire state of world affairs.[23]

Considering the steady deterioration of the already tense period following World War II, it is doubtful that the same rate of disarmament, especially in manpower, would have been undertaken by the United States if a unified national security organization had existed. As early as August, 1945, the records indicate that the military leaders foresaw the danger of demobilizing in the rapid manner ordered by the President because this would leave a power vacuum in Europe. The President made his decision for immediate and drastic cutbacks of military forces on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chief Executive, particularly domestic political pressures.[24] It is extremely important that if the military advice had been delivered under a

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[23] Ibid., pp. 19-20.

[24] Millis, op. cit., p. 121.

unified system and submitted through the prestigious National Security Council that the President would have gambled with the nation's security position.

The unification conflict did not cease with the act of unifying. The next phase of the controversy began almost immediately after the "National Security Act" took effect. The act of unification and subsequent functioning of the act was aptly described by Marx Leva, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense in a speech delivered in April, 1949. His description stated that:

> The 1947 Act . . . consisted of a simultaneous marriage (joining the Army and Navy in a state of more or less happy wedlock), a divorce (separating the Air Force from the Army), and twin births (creating the over-all organization known as the National Military Establishment, and creating the Air Force as well).
>
> Up to the present time, the divorce of the Air Force from the Army has proceeded more smoothly than has the marriage of the Army and Navy. It may be that the explanation for this situation can be traced to the fact that the Army, which greatly desired unification, was an over ardent bridegroom--while the Navy was a most reluctant bride.[26]

However, new dimensions were being added to the unification controversy which were not included in Mr. Leva's

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[26]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on S.1269 and S.1843, March 24-May 6, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 256. Hereafter referred to as National Security Act Amendments of 1949.

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of unification. The next phase of the controversy began al-
most immediately after the "National Security Act" took
effect. The act of unification and subsequent rewriting
of the act was aptly described by Hanson Baldwin,
assistant to the secretary of defense in a speech delivered
in April, 1949. His description reads thus:

> The 1947 act -- a compromise of a diminishing
> majority (piloting the Army and Navy in a state of
> more or less happy wedlock), a divorce (separating
> the air force from the Army), and twin births
> (creating the over-all organization known as the
> National Military Establishment, and creating the
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> that the explanation for this situation can be viewed
> in the fact that the Army, which originally obtained
> the Navy was a most reluctant bride.[79]

However, new dimensions were being added to the uni-
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[79]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act Amendments of 1949, Hearings, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., on S.1269 and S.1843, March 21-May 5, 1949 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 254. Hereafter referred to as National Security Act Amendments of 1949.

description and which were not a factor in the 1944-1947 period. These included two new actors who had developed corporate interests in their own right--the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Both of these actors wished to increase their sphere of influence and authority.[27] In fact, the Senate hearings on the National Security Act Amendments of 1949 were almost completely concerned with this aspect of unification. The Administration bill, as summarized by Secretary of Defense Forrestal, was designed to:

> (1) Clarify the authority of the Secretary of Defense to direct and control the military departments; (2) Provide the Secretary with the additional staff assistance required for the proper exercise of his increased authority, including an under Secretary of Defense and a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; (3) Strengthen civilian control over the Joint Chiefs of Staff by providing the Chairman I have just mentioned, who would be directly accountable to the President and the Secretary of Defense, rather than to the individual military departments; (4) Recreate the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board as staff agencies directly responsible to the Secretary of Defense.[28]

The only military objection to the bill was made by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who wished to limit the powers which it would grant to the Secretary of Defense. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs entered recommendations during

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[27] Caraley, op. cit., p. 282.

[28] National Security Act Amendments of 1949, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

their testimony which would strengthen, or at least maintain, their own position of influence. In this respect, they wished to limit the authority of the proposed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs; they desired the authority to name the director of the Joint Staff which presently resided in the Secretary; they wanted to strike out a proposed provision which would allow the Secretary to make inter-service personnel transfers; they desired a clear-cut definition of Joint Chief functions which could not be abraded by the Secretary of Defense; and they suggested that the Munitions Board fall under their direction rather than the Secretary's.[29]

The fact that amendment was felt necessary implies that unification was not succeeding. The economies being effected through less duplication was one of the causes of continued inter-service competition. With an austere budget, the services competed even more sharply for scarce appropriations. This often took the form of berating the needs or functions of the other services and, therefore, kept the rivalry at a high pitch, even though more muted to the public ear.[30]

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[29] Ibid., pp. 107-125.

[30] Caraley, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

the public mind."[20]

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[20] Hearings, 1966 Civil, pp. 285-293.

[21] Ibid., pp. 101-112.

With the Amendments of 1949, the Secretary of Defense gained greater direction over the newly-established Executive Department of Defense. The increased power was almost immediately wielded in the so-called "revolt of the Admirals" incident. In this case, Secretary of Defense Louis Johnson made the decision to stop work on the U.S.S. United States, a new super carrier, and the Navy carried its case to Congress and the public. This action was considered insubordination by the Secretary, and he requested that the Chief of Naval Operations, who was also a Joint Chief, be relieved. The President complied with the request and Admiral Denfield dutifully submitted his resignation.[31]

The Secretary of Defense was soon to find, however, that the political influence of the military leaders also had to be reckoned with. During the two years subsequent to the carrier incident and the resulting B-36 controversy, the Secretary fell under increasing criticism of the press and Congress.[32] The running fight between Secretary Johnson and the services was culminated in his dismissal in

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[31]Stanley, op. cit., pp. 93-95.

[32]United States Congress, Senate Document No. 204, Mobilization Planning and the National Security (1950-1960): Problems and Issues, Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 243-245.

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September of 1950 as a result of military unpreparedness for the war in Korea.[33]

The Eisenhower Administration

The next major phase in the unification conflict came as a result of experiences gained in the Korean War and a change in the Administration. On February 19, 1953, the Secretary of Defense, on the authority and direction of President Eisenhower, ordered a study of the Defense Department Organization. This resulted in the Rockefeller Committee investigation and report. The committee heard testimony from only twenty-two specially invited witnesses and deliberated only a few weeks before it brought in its findings.[34] The recommendations of the Rockefeller Report became almost in its entirety "Reorganization Plan Number 6 of 1953."[35]

The reorganization of the Department of Defense proposed and effected in 1953 hardly mentioned the Armed Forces. The primary significance of the plan was to strengthen both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to adding six

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[33]Stanley, op. cit., p. 99.

[34]R. Earl McClendon, Changes in Organization for National Defense, 1949-1953 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Documentary Research Study, 1956), pp. 35-37.

[35]Ibid., p. 49.

September of 1930 as a result of military maneuvers for the war in Europe.[33]

The Stennes Insurrection

The next major phase in the militarization controlled case as a result of disagreements between the and a change in the administration. On January 17, 1931, the Jackpeters in Detroit, in the absence of the national president Stennes, ordered a study of the Detroit Bund Organization. This resulted in the subsequent Commander Isserstedt and others. The Commander there emphasized that only command-type activity was assigned only a few weeks before it happened in the Detroit.[34] The subcommandants of the Headquarters Staff knew of 1931.[35]

The investigation of the Jackpeters also showed that planned and effected in 1932 Nazify membership the Bund records. The primary significance of the plan was to strengthen both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In addition to adding six

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[33]Leonard, DD, 1941, p. 29.

[34]U. S. Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Investigation, Case National Socialist, 1933-1942 (Typewritten) 62-1 Detroit, Chicago, 29, p. 1.

[35]Ibid., p. 47.

additional Assistant Secretaries and a General Council to the Secretary of Defense's staff and dissolving various boards with the newly-assigned Assistant Secretaries taking over these functions, the "Plan" gave to the Secretary of Defense the authority to transfer personnel, resources, and functions as he deemed necessary for national security. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was placed in a superior position to the Joint Chiefs and other functions, normally conducted by the Joint Chiefs, were transferred to the Chairman.[36]

The effect of the "Reorganization Plan of 1953" was to accomplish a greater degree of unification than had been heretofore possible. For example, the sacredness of the Key West Agreement was radically undermined. Just two days after the "Plan" became law, the Secretary of Defense ordered a revision of the functions of the Armed Forces in order to make them more compatible to the unified command concept.[37]

This action undoubtedly improved the overall security posture of the nation; however, it did little to improve the basic causes for controversy among the services--the competition caused by corporate interest. In fact, the implementation of the Rockefeller Committee recommendation

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[36] Ibid., p. 75. [37] Ibid., p. 68.

was bound to have a disquieting effect on the Naval Service because these suggested reforms closely paralleled the President's proposals when he was the Army's Chief of Staff supporting the 1946 and 1947 bills on unification.[38]

The President's "Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953" reflected the evolution of the unification conflict to matters substantially embracing structural political power. This was not to imply that the differences and disagreements between the services were becoming less intense or that unification had become a dead issue with the military. It meant that the influence of military leaders had been considerably degraded and that civilian political control had been strengthened. This was the period in which military dissent was apt to cause the invoking of sanctions, and the mere disagreement with the administration politico-military party line would cause the exertion of frequent and extensive pressure toward conformance.[39]

This period also saw the entrance of the military into the political arena. While there had been political actions at earlier dates, the concept that military men should deal with only military matters was firmly established. "They were expected to accept public responsibility

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[38] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., pp. 97-102.

[39] Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 19.

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[39]National Defense Establishment, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 97-103.

[40]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1959), p. 13.

for the actions of the Administration in the field of Military Policy," according to General Taylor, "regardless of their own views and recommendations." And later, speaking of the mass exodus of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when President Eisenhower took office, General Taylor was to say:

> This event was profoundly disturbing to most professional military men. It suggested that the Joint Chiefs belonged to the Administration in power and were expected to be the spokesmen for its military policy.[40]

Most of the Eisenhower Administration was to continue with undercurrents of the unification conflict bubbling to the surface periodically. The trend became one of differences in strategic concepts which reflected the views of the various service leaders and the Administration.[41] The Administration concern for a balanced budget and the resulting competition for favorable consideration within the budget process were also important factors in the controversy.[42] The methods of conflict, news leaks, and informal liaison with "friends" in Congress were also continued. The speech-making activities of military leaders were curtailed but not eliminated.[43]

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[40] Ibid., pp. 19-20. [41] Ibid., pp. 40-41.

[42] Caraley, op. cit., pp. 282-283.

[43] John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 109. Professor Swomley cited as the source of this information a news conference made by President Kennedy, February 1, 1961. While

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[40] Taylor, op. cit., pp. 185-187.

[41] John G. Norris, "The Military Establishment: Unification as the Source of the Interservice Conflict," (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954), p. 107. Lemnitzer, Taylor, and [illegible] made by [illegible] Kennedy, "Security I," 1961. While

[42] Taylor, op. cit., pp. 19-20.

[43] Taylor, op. cit., pp. 40-41.

The only other significant aspect of the unification controversy, during the Eisenhower Administration, was the reorganization and streamlining of the military chain of command in 1958. This was accomplished by the elimination of extra administration echelons and offices in the military chain of command and provided for the direct operation of the joint command system by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It also strengthened the Department of Defense's control of the individual service departments by stripping these agencies of operational functions except those in support of operating forces.[44]

The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations

The Kennedy-Johnson Administrations offered real hope for resolving some of the causes of the continuing unification controversy. These efforts were primarily concerned with the budget process. The practice of a ceiling being arbitrarily placed on defense spending, as was practiced during the Eisenhower Administration, was to be replaced with a more realistic system consisting of the individual services determining what was needed to maintain

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specifics cannot be substantiated, this statement apparently refers to the number of official speech clearances denied during the Eisenhower Administration by the Department of Defense.

[44]Caraley, op. cit., p. 283.

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[64]Cooney, op. cit., p. 283.

an integrated defense posture. This was the official statement of policy:

> Throughout the preparation of . . . the fiscal year of 1965 budget, we have been guided by the same two general instructions given to me originally by President Kennedy and re-emphasized so strongly by President Johnson, namely, to develop the force structure necessary to meet our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceiling or predetermined financial limits, and to procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.[45]

The budget policy was a positive step toward lessening the factors which caused inter-service rivalries. However, the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations strengthened the Secretary of Defense's control of military policy to an even greater extent than had been effected previously and, therefore, all services lost more of their influence and prestige. This situation was bound to cause friction between the new, more powerful office of the Department of Defense and the military departments.[46]

The old and continuing competition between the services became more muted in the Kennedy-Johnson Administration. While part of the relative quietness may have been

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[45]United States Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense Program and 1965 Defense Budget, January 27, 1964, p. 2. (Mimeographed.)

[46]Harry H. Ransom, "Department of Defense: Unity or Confederation," American Defense Policy, ed. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 179.

as interpreted defense policies. This was the official rationale of policy:

> [Reviewing the preparation of F. Y. the Bland year of 1952 budget, we have been guided by two vague but powerful imperatives given to us originally by President Truman, namely, to develop the force structure necessary to meet our military requirements adjusted to political limits, and to procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.][45]

The budget policy was expected to keep Soviet-American [illegible] the Eisenhower version reverses [illegible] however, the Kennedy-Johnson modifications strengthened the secretary of defense's control of military policy to an even greater extent than had been effected previously and, therefore, all services lost more of their influence and prestige. This situation was bound to bring friction between the new, more powerful office of the Department of Defense and the military departments.[46]

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[46] Harry H. Ransom, "Department of Defense: Unity or Confusion," American Defense Policy, ed. Quincy W. Powers et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 179.

the result of the new budget policy, the fact that the Secretary of Defense further tightened the controls over press releases and speeches of officers should not be discounted.[47] Yet, even with tighter controls, the dissents by military figures, directed against the Office of the Department of Defense, have grown stronger, even if less effective.

Some of the controversies, which have erupted since 1961, involved the TFX, the B-70, nuclear frigates, and NIKE-X missiles. These were controversies which struck too close to home for the professional military officer. They were questions which involved the professional expertise of the military and the ultimate decisions were made by the civilian leadership.[48] Therefore, regardless of system used to derive the decision, civilian expertise was utilized in the determination of the military effectiveness of weapons or weapons systems.

Another area of friction during this period has been the charge that the civilian leaders within the Department of Defense have used pressure on military officers who hold differing opinions on strategy or military policy. The nature of this controversy was reflected during Senate

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[47] Ibid., p. 178.

[48] Wesley W. Posvar, "The Realm of Obscurity," American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 230.

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[42] Ibid., p. 174.

[43] Huntley, In Enemy, "The Revolt of Conscience," Commen-
tary, 32: 218-, p. 230.

hearings in February, 1966. The following exchange occurred during the discussion about policy acceptance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

> Senator Thurman. I am glad you brought this matter up. I have had occasion to talk to a number of military people and they do not feel as General Wheeler does. They are his colleagues. Some of them are very high ranking colleagues. They feel that they are under compulsion and duress in this matter. I had occasion to talk to one in the last few days, a rather high ranking officer, several stars, and I don't think there is any question that the public knows that they are muzzled over there. They are under coersion . . . .
>
> Chairman Russell. Both of them /Secretary McNamara and General Wheeler/ have stated for the record that there was no compulsion . . . .
>
> Secretary McNamara. Mr. Chairman, I was going to make that same point. I think this is a serious charge . . . .[49]

This discussion of the unification conflict is not meant to imply that a state of hostility exists at all levels within the Department of Defense. The details of conflict have been covered to provide an insight into factors bearing on the military-civilian policy-making system. It should be sufficient to note that whatever conflicts have existed or still exist have not prevented a considerable degree of success in the development of

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[49]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, Hearings, 81th Cong., 2d Sess., on S.2950, February 23-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 230-231.

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Senator Symington. I am glad you brought this matter up. I have had occasion to call to a meeting of military people and they do not feel as depressed about morale. They are very high running politicians. Some of them are very much concerned and during in this meeting. I had occasion to call to one in the last few days, a retired high ranking officer, several stars, and I don't think there is any question that the public knows that they are married over there. They are under control. . . .

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[49]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1971, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d Session, February 17-March 31, 1970 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1970), pp. 330-332.

national security policy. Yet, the atmosphere surrounding the policy-making system does have an effect on the influence and involvement of the military in the process and should be considered in evaluating the military role.

The next area to be covered will involve the national security policy machinery within which the military operates to affect policy.

## II. THE UNIFICATION ACT

The "National Security Act of 1947," as amended, provides the structural machinery for formulating national security policy. It also constitutes the legal foundations for military unification. Inasmuch as any study of military influence on national security policy must, to some degree, concern itself with the institution within which it operates, a brief description of some provisions of the "National Security Act of 1947" will be undertaken.

In section 2 of the Act, Congress explicitly set forth a declaration of policy. The declaration stated that, in providing "for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security" and in establishing a Department of Defense which will include the three military departments, "under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense," the merger of the services is prohibited. Instead, the Secretary of Defense

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## III. THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT

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was charged with the responsibility of providing "unified direction" to the military departments. The declaration further provided "for the establishment of unified or specified combatant commands" and a clearly-defined, direct chain of command for effective operation of these forces. Overall direction and control was vested in the Secretary of Defense in order to "eliminate unnecessary duplication" and "to provide more effective, efficient and economical administration in the Department of Defense." The establishment of a "single Chief of Staff over the Armed Forces" or an Armed Forces General Staff was specifically prohibited.

The Act provided for the establishment of a National Security Council with the function of advising the President "with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security." The membership of the council was restricted to the President, Vice President, the Secretaries of Defense and State and the Director, Office of Emergency Planning.

Under the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency was established. The function of C.I.A. was to "coordinate the intelligence activities of the several Government departments in the interest of National

Security" and "to advise the National Security Council in matters concerning such intelligence activities . . . as relate to national security." Additionally, the C.I.A. was charged with the correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence information as it relates to national security. The agency was also charged with the responsibility of performing "such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." The Director or Deputy Director of the agency was required to be a military officer but, at no time, were both to be from the active or retired list of commissioned officers.

Provision for an Office of Emergency Planning was included in the Act and the function of this office was to advise the President "concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization."[50]

The first thing that comes to mind after reading the "National Security Act of 1947" is that there is some inconsistency in its phrasing. This ambiguity has caused the Act to be described as "a document that calls simultaneously for 'integration' and 'separation'; for 'unified direction' but not merger; strategic 'integration' but not a unified

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[50] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 1-5. Source of previous five paragraphs.

staff by which this can be accomplished."[51] Yet, the background of the pros and cons of unification indicates that the language of the Act represents fairly accurately the compromise in approaches which were necessary to make any progress in this area.

Unity not Unitarian

As originally instituted, the National Defense Establishment was designed to be more a confederation than a union. This was caused by Congress desiring the best features of both. However, it became readily apparent by the time hearings were conducted on the bill's first amendment in 1949 that, rather than the best of two worlds, many of the evils of each had been acquired. In fact, Secretary of the Army Kenneth C. Royall testified that he believed that the nation had lost ground rather than improved its security posture. This position was taken in spite of the fact that he was a strong advocate of unification and supported a stronger director for the defense effort.[52]

Each effort to modify the "National Security Act of 1947" resulted in a step toward the merger feared by many Congressmen and military officers. Yet, even to date, the best description of the Department of Defense is unity not

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[51] Ransom, op. cit., p. 171.

[52] National Security Act Amendments of 1949, op. cit., pp. 181-182.

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[11] Hearings, 64th., p. 1171.

[12] National Security and Unification of 1947, op. cit.,
p. 101-102.

unitarian. This condition is specifically structured by the provisions of the "National Security Act of 1947" and Title 10, United States Code, sections 125 and 133.

The Secretary of Defense "is the head of the Department of Defense" and "is the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense." Although specific powers to consolidate functions within the Department were granted in order to eliminate duplication and "to provide more effective efficient, and economical administration and operation . . . in the Department of Defense," it was also stated that any "function, power or duty invested in the Department of Defense, or an officer, official or agency thereof, by law may not be substantially transferred,consolidated, or abolished" until the proposal has been made to Congress. Congress then has thirty days in which to disapprove an undesirable Act.

Within the provisions for the military departments, the same type structure was sought. The military departments were separately organized under their own Secretary, but they were specifically charged to operate "under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense." Each service secretary retained the right "to make such recommendations to Congress relating to the Department of Defense as they consider necessary," but this

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provision required that the Secretary of Defense be informed before recommendations were made.

The Secretary of Defense, under the President, was charged with the responsibility of establishing "unified combatant commands or specified combatant commands to perform military missions" and he was further empowered to "prescribe the force structure of those commands." This power was limited only by the stipulation that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would advise and assist in the establishment of commands and that the service departments were responsible for the assignment and training of the forces which comprise the various unified commands. The combatant commands were made directly "responsible to the President and the Secretary for such military missions as may be assigned" by "the Secretary with the approval of the President."[53]

Centralized Control

One of the age-old fears of Congress and the public has been the threat presented to democratic government by a monolithic military organization. It was this aspect of unification which delayed action in the progress toward consolidation until 1947 and which is still the central point of criticism of the Department of Defense.

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[53] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 7-13. Also refers to previous three paragraphs.

## Centralized Control

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[12] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 7-12. Also refer to previous three paragraphs.

There can be little doubt that the present organization for national defense has centralized control of the military departments and their functions. The centralization of control was heavily invested in the Secretary of Defense, explicitly and implicitly, by the "National Security Act of 1947." In addition to those aspects previously mentioned, the Secretary of Defense was made chairman of the Armed Forces Policy Council "with the power of decision." The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as "the principal advisors to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense" [Italics added]. The director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was appointed with the approval of the Secretary. The Secretary of Defense also controlled the combined budget of the Defense Department.[54]

The ready military power of the nation has been centralized into the unified command system specified by the "National Security Act of 1947" by answering to the Secretary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[55] The unified commands presently consist of the Alaskan, Atlantic, Continental Air Defense, European, Pacific, Southern, Strategic Air, and Strike Commands.[56] The Secretary of Defense

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[54] Ibid., pp. 13-21. [55] Ibid., pp. 12 and 19.

[56] Office of the Federal Register, United States Government Organization Manual 1966-67 (Washington:

There can be little doubt that the present organization for national defense has centralized control of the military departments and their functions. The centralization concept was heavily invested in the secretary of defense, multiplicity and implicitly, by the "National Security Act of 1947." In addition to these authorities previously mentioned, the secretary of defense was made chairman of the newly formed Joint Council with the power of mediation." The Joint Chiefs of Staff were established as "the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense." [Italics added]. The director of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was empowered with the approval of the Secretary, "The Secretary of Defense also controlled the combined budget of the Defense Department."[24]

The ready military power of the nation has been centralized into the unified command system specified by the National Security Act of 1947 by responding to the Secretary of Defense via the Joint Chiefs of Staff.[25] The unified commands presently consist of the Strategic Retaliatory Command Air Defense, Continental Air Defense, Tactical Air Command, Air Force Logistic Command, and Strike Command,[26] the Secretary of Defense

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[24]Ibid., pp. 13-17. [25]Ibid., pp. 12 and 13.

[26]Office of the General Assistant, United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Washington,

has several primary assistants who have the function of coordinating the efforts of the Defense Department.

Civilian Supremacy Reinforced

As previously discussed, some fear had been generated over the prospects of a single, consolidated armed force. This fear was centered on the "Man on Horseback" theory by some and on the "captured" civilian Secretary by the all-powerful military by others. These fears have not been realized in relation to the military gaining increased control. "In actual fact," writes Huntington, "the power of the military professions 'in the councils of government' has decreased steadily since World War II."[57] That power which the military previously held has been assumed by the civilian Secretary and, in addition, other powers created by the integration of military-political influences in nation security policy have been civilianized. As a specific example, it has been said that "the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is the one most directly related to the overall organization for national security."[58] And this office has

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Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 611. Hereafter referred to as Government Organization Manual.

[57] Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 186.

[58] Stanley, op. cit., p. 45.

has asserted primary assistance who have the function of coordinating the efforts of the Defense Department.

Civilian Secretary Unilateral

As previously discussed, some role has been developed over the prerogatives of a single, consolidated armed force. This trend was centered on the "man in uniform" theory by some and on the "replaced civilian secretary by the all-powerful military by others. These fears have not been realized in reflection be the military gaining increased control. "In actual fact," writes Huntington, "the power of the military professions 'in the councils of government' has decreased steadily since World War II."[37] That power which the military previously held has been assumed by the civilian secretary and, in addition, other powers created by the integration of military-political influences in nation security policy have been civilianized. As a specific example, it has been held that "the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is now one most directly related to the overall organization for national security."[38] And this office was

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[36] Huntington, op. cit., p. 40.

[37] Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," American Defense Policy, rev. ed., p. 186.

[38] Department of Defense, Directive 5111.1, Reorganization Pursuant to the Department Reorganization Manual.

only one military officer as a principal official versus seven civilian Deputy Assistant Secretaries.[59]

By the insertion of the Secretary of Defense above the service secretaries, another level of civilian leadership was placed between the military departments and the prime policy maker, the President. By the same token, individual military leaders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, have been denied access to the policy-making machinery except through the Secretary of Defense. This is not meant to imply that the military influence in the formulation of national security policy has been radically degraded. It does mean that military influence has been made subject to civilian review and control and, therefore, civilian supremacy has been strengthened.

## III. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

The Department of Defense is, perhaps, the most important functionary in the national security process. This department is comprised of all military and civilian government agencies which are directly concerned with the nation's military posture.[60] In addition to involvement in strictly military strategy, the Department of Defense maintains

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[59] Government Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 133.

[60] Ibid., pp. 137-145 and 611.

military strength, the Department of Defense maintains many agencies which are directly concerned with the nation's defense posture.[60] In addition to involvement in strictly military planning of all military and civilian defense-related functions necessary in the national security process. This department is composed of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Assistant Secretaries, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

III. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

The department of defense is, perhaps, the most important agency in the national security process. This does mean that military influence has been made subject to civilian review and control and, therefore, civilian supremacy has been strengthened.

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[60]Ibid., pp. 137-142 and 411.

[61]Harrison Brown, et al., The Next Fifty Years, p. 133.

liaison with other governmental agencies concerned with defense policy in its broadest connotations. The need for effective organization and coordination readily becomes apparent when the full scope of the department's efforts are examined.

Organizational Aspects

An organization chart of the Department of Defense, Figure 1, is provided on the following page. This chart will be referred to in the following analysis of the Department of Defense organization.

The Office of the Secretary of Defense was organized to supervise and coordinate the many agencies and departments which make up the Department of Defense. This office was originally envisioned as a lightly-staffed executive group. Initial estimates of staffing requirements indicated that, in addition to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, only four special assistants and one hundred civilian clerical and administrative personnel would be required to staff the office.[61] This concept, based on limited functions, rapidly became outmoded as the executive and administrative responsibilities of the Secretary increased. As of October 31, 1966, the total number of civilian personnel utilized in the office of the Secretary of Defense was 2,584. There

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[61] National Defense Establishment, op. cit., p. 502.

liaison with other governmental agencies concerned with defense policy to the broadest considerations. The need for effective organization and coordination readily becomes apparent when the full scope of the department's efforts are examined.

Organizational Structure

An organization chart of the Department of Defense, Figure 1, is provided on the following page. This Chart will be referred to in the following analysis of the Department of Defense organization.

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[61] Enthoven, Defense Expenditures, op. cit., p. 203.

Figure 1. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ORGANIZATION CHART from Government Organization Manual, p. 611


ARMED FORCES POLICY COUNCIL
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
DIRECTOR OF DEFENSE RESEARCH AND ENGR.
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ADM.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMPT.)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INSTALLATIONS AND LOGISTICS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MAN POWER)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (PUBLIC AFFAIRS)
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (SYSTEMS ANALYSIS)
GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DPT. OF DEFENSE
ASSISTANTS TO THE SECRETARY (ATOMIC ENERGY) (LEGIS. AFFAIRS)
THE JOINT STAFF
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CHAIRMAN – JCS
CHIEF OF STAFF – ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF – NAVY
CHIEF OF STAFF – AIR FORCE
COMMANDANT – MARINE CORPS
DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY
DEFENSE SUPPLY AGENCY
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE
CHIEF OF STAFF AIR FORCE
DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ALASKAN COMMAND
ATLANTIC COMMAND
CONTINENTAL AIR DEFENSE COMMAND
EUROPEAN COMMAND
PACIFIC COMMAND
SOUTHERN COMMAND
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND
STRIKE COMMAND

were also 2,856 military officers and enlisted men assigned to the various assistants to the Secretary.[62] This figure excludes those military and civilian personnel assigned to the Joint Staff. This manifold increase in personnel requirements represented the increased scope, functions, and authority vested in the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and agency directors.

The "National Security Act of 1947" specifically made all assistants to the Secretary of Defense, other than the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subordinate in precedence to the service Secretaries. These assistants were also denied decision-making authority on the grounds that they were administrators and advisers.[63] However, this restriction on power was circumscribed by the delegation of authority clause and through the practical assumption of necessary power to enforce policy.[64] The pragmatic functioning of the Department of Defense organization worked to

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[62]United States Department of Defense, "Civilian and Military Personnel--Office of the Department of Defense," Directorate for Statistical Services, OSD, 1 December 1966. Working papers for budget preparation, copy held by candidate. Hereafter referred to as "Civilian and Military Personnel."

[63]National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 13-14 and 68.

[64]Ibid., pp. 15-17; and Government Organization Manual, op. cit., pp. 207-214.

were also 3,856 military officers and enlisted men assigned to the various assistants to the Secretary.[62] This figure excludes those military and civilian personnel assigned to the Joint Staff. This manifold increase in personnel furthermore represented the increased scope, functions, and authority vested in the assistant Secretaries of Defense and agency directors.

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[63]*National Security Act of 1947*, 80th. *Cit.*, pp. 13-14 and 18.

[64]*Ibid.*, pp. 15-17; and *Government Organization Manual*, *Op. Cit.*; pp. 527-528.

relegate the service Secretaries to an equal position as that recognized for the unified agency heads. The primary difference retained was a matter of prestige and status which resulted from the requirement of Presidential appointment and the dubious distinction of authority to go direct to Congress.

Another factor which the organization chart fails to represent is the blurring of function and authority caused by dual responsibilities of some officials. For instance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while in their capacity of military advisers to the Secretary and members of the Armed Forces Policy Council, operate as an integral part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. In their capacity as unified combatant force commanders and military strategy formulators, the Joint Chiefs and their staff occupy a level outside of, but immediately under, the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The Joint Chiefs, by virtue of yet a third function, being the military commanders within the three service departments, occupy a position in the hierarchy below their respective service Secretaries.[65]

Administrative Responsibilities

The administrative responsibilities within the Department of Defense were, to a great degree, responsible

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[65] Government Organization Manual, op. cit., pp. 145-146 and 611-614.

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Administrative Responsibilities

The administrative responsibilities within the Department of Defense were, to a great degree, responsible

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[65] Department Organization Manual, op. cit., pp. 145-146 and 611-614.

for the increased size of the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although many of the administrative functions remained with the existing departments and agencies, the problems of control and coordination vastly expanded both the civilian and military staffs of the Secretary. The main areas of administration envisioned by the "National Security Act of 1947" concerned possible economies which would be made possible through unification. The primary areas were perceived in budget matters and procurement.[66] However, as the Office of the Secretary evolved into a bureaucracy in its own right, administration requirements at all levels were increased proportionally.

Today, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Administration employs 396 military and civilian personnel in coping with his administrative responsibilities.[67] The administrative responsibilities which have accrued to other, and supposedly more immune, assistant Secretaries can be interpolated from available data. As an example, the Director Research and Engineering testified before Congress that he had 103 civilians and 47 military officers who performed technical functions in his office.[68] At the same

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[66] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 14, 27 and 29.

[67] "Civilian and Military Personnel," loc. cit.

[68] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed

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[66] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., pp. 14, 21 and 23.

[67] Civilian and Military Reserves," loc. cit.

time, the total personnel assigned to this office were in excess of five hundred people.[69] The story is much the same with all offices in the Department of Defense.

The administrative responsibilities of the Department of Defense are an important area through which military influence can be directed to affect the national security policy process. Policy goals, by nature, are expressed in general terms and can be shaded through administrative interpretation. The administrative process also determines, to a great degree, where and how the military defense funds will be spent through procurement procedures and contract determination.

Coordination of Policy Planning

Probably the most vital issue confronting the national security policy process concerns coordination. Although this problem is applicable to the internal machinations of the Department of Defense, in-house difficulties can be resolved by fiat and, therefore, are not of predominant significance. The primary policy coordination problems have been of inter-departmental nature. This has been

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Services, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964, Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 2440 (S.843), February 19-March 8, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 452-453.

[69]"Civilian and Military Personnel," loc. cit.

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Services, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year 1964, Hearings, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on H.R. 7660 (6 pts.), February 13-March 8, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 452-453.

[63] Civilian and Military Personnel, loc. cit.

particularly true between the two policy-making departments, Defense and State.

The problem of coordinating military and foreign policy were recognized by President Truman and constituted the primary reason that he desired unification.[70] The "National Security Act of 1947" tackled the problem of policy coordination through the establishment of the National Security Council. This organization was designed to integrate military, domestic, and foreign policy at the highest levels. However, it rapidly became apparent that the problem of coordination was more critical and required greater attention at lower levels than the National Security Council. Therefore, the Operations Coordinating Board was established by Executive Order 10483 of September 2, 1953. The function of this board was "to assist in effective coordination among certain agencies of certain functions relating to national security and to provide for integrated implementations of national security policies by these agencies."[71]

The Operations Coordinating Board remained the primary instrument, in name if not in fact, for resolving policy disputes until 1961. McGeorge Bundy speaking of the

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[70] Millis, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

[71] Government Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 689.

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[70]Millis, op. cit., pp. 119-120.

[71]Government Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 687.

board's abolishment by President Kennedy said its primary failure was attributable to the indecisiveness of the membership and that "the decisive difficulty in the OCB was that without unanimity it had no authority."[72] The President determined that the functions of the Operations Coordinating Board could be better performed by dealing directly with the departments concerned and by strengthening the Secretary of State.[73]

The Kennedy Administration relied, to a great extent, on the "task group" concept and ad hoc committees to solve policy coordination problems. President Johnson transferred many of these functions to the Secretary of State and his regional Assistant Secretaries. This system was formalized by President Johnson in a White House announcement on March 4, 1966. The Secretary of State, as the President's agent was charged with the responsibility of coordinating all interdepartmental matters affecting national security policy. The announcement further revealed the creation of two new instruments to allow effective

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[72]United States Congress, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security: Selected Papers, Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 6.

[73]Ibid., p. 3.

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[73] Ibid., p. 1.

coordination of policy--the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG) and Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG). The character and purpose of the Senior Interdepartmental Group was made evident by the statement:

> To assist the Secretary of State in this new role, there will be a permanent interdepartmental committee, called the Senior Interdepartmental Group (SIG), with the Under Secretary of State as its "Executive Chairman." The latter term is used to describe a chairman who has the authority and responsibility to decide all matters coming before his committee, subject to the right of any member to appeal his decision to higher authority. This is an important provision which makes the difference between the normal committee and an incisive, decision making body.
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> The other regular members of the Senior Interdepartmental Group are: the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of AID, the Director of CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director of USIA, and the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.[74]

The Interdepartmental Regional Groups were established at a lower level, using the regional Assistant Secretaries of State as Executive Chairmen, in order to relieve the Senior Interdepartmental Group of the large volume of work required. In all cases, the Chairmen have the decision making responsibility when considering split issues.[75]

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[74]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordination: New Duties and Procedures of March 4, 1966, Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 1.

[75]Ibid., pp. 2 and 8.

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[75] Ibid., pp. 3 and 8.

Within the Department of Defense, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is charged with:

> Developing and coordinating Defense positions, policies, plans, and procedures in the fields of international politico-military and foreign economic affairs, including disarmament, of interest to the Department of Defense and with respect to negotiating and monitoring of agreements with foreign governments and international organizations on military facilities, operating rights, status of forces, and other international politico-military matters . . . .[76]

Therefore, this office was charged with all liaison between the Joint Chiefs and their military policy and the State Department or other outside agency. It is interesting to note that the function of the International Security Affairs office in the area of politico-military appears to parallel the position which President Kennedy implied for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a letter to the Joint Chiefs in June, 1961, the President said:

> While I look to the Chiefs to present the military factor without reserve or hesitation, I regard them to be more than military men and expect their help in fitting military requirements into the overall contest of any situation, recognizing that the most difficult problem in Government is to combine all assets in a unified, effective pattern.[77]

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[76] Government Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 141.

[77] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operation, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 553. Quoted in a

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Therefore, this office was charged with differences between the Joint Chiefs and their military policy and the State Department or other overlap agency. It is interesting to note also the function of the International-Security Affairs office in the area of politico-military spheres to parallel the position which President Kennedy implied for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a letter to the Joint Chiefs in June, 1961, the President said:

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[76] Secretary Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 1-1.

[77] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 2d sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 553. Quoted in a

## IV. THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The "National Security Act of 1947" formalized by statute the existence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and made the provision for the Joint Chiefs of Staff to assist in the formulation of military strategy. As previously noted, the Joint Chiefs were assigned both advisory and operational functions.

Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs represent the primary, direct influence of the military in the formulation and implementation of national military strategy, their institutionalized functions and organization are significant to this study.

### Functions of JCS

As previously noted, the Joint Chiefs requested and received legal recognition of their primary functions during hearings on the first amendment to the "National Security Act" in 1949.[78] These functions were made explicit by Article 141 (d) which stated:

> Subject to the authority and direction of the President and the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall--(1) prepare strategic plans and provide for the strategic direction of the armed forces; (2) prepare joint logistic plans and assign

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speech made by General Maxwell Taylor in February, 1964, to the American Bar Association.

[78] See supra, pp. 62-63, and fn. 29.

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[78] See Hearings, pps. 81-83, and pp. 89.

> logistic responsibilities to the armed forces in accordance with those plans; (3) establish unified commands in strategic areas; (4) review the major material and personnel requirements of the armed forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans; (5) formulate policies for the joint training of the armed forces; (6) formulate policies for coordinating the military education of members of the armed forces; (7) provide for representation of the United States on the Military Staff Committee of the United Nations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations; and (8) perform such other duties as the President or the Secretary of Defense may describe.[79]

Among the "other duties," accepted by direction or precedence, were to:

> Provide guidance to the individual departments in the preparation of their respective detailed plans; . . . prepare joint plans for military mobilization; . . . recommend to the Secretary of Defense the establishment and force structure of unified and specified commands; . . . . Reviews the plans and programs of these commands to determine their adequacy, feasibility, and suitability; . . . prepare plans, policies, reports and directives in matters pertaining to the Military Assistance Program . . . advise the Secretary of Defense on broad integrated research and development programs.[80]

Organizational Aspects

The composition and hierarchal position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were previously covered in the discussion of the Defense Department. However, the scope of the Joint Chiefs' functions and responsibilities can be better

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[79] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 19.

[80] Jack D. Nicholas et al., The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1959), pp. 22-23.

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Organizational Response

The composition and hierarchal position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff were previously covered in the discussion of the various Departments. However, the scope of the Joint Chiefs' functions and responsibilities can be better

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[79] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 12.

[80] Jack D. Hatsford et al., The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1958), pp. 22-23.

appreciated from the organizational chart, Figure 2, which is provided on the following page.[81]

The primary support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the area of military strategy and policy, was provided by the assignment of the Joint Staff. The efforts of the Joint Staff were to be coordinated and guided by the Director of the Joint Staff who, in turn, was to be managed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. All duties undertaken by the Staff were to be prescribed by the Joint Chiefs or the Chairman.[82] The Staff was organized on a joint service basis and along functional lines. The conventional staff divisions consisted of J1 Personnel Directorate, J2 Intelligence Directorate, J3 Operations Directorate, J4 Logistics Directorate, J5 Plans and Policy Directorate, J6 Communications Electronics Directorate, a Military Assistance Directorate, a Joint Programs Office, and a Joint Advanced Study Group.[83]

Although the military composition of the Joint Staff was originally limited to one hundred officers, this number

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[81]Sources for constructing Joint Chiefs of Staff organization chart were Government Organization Manual, op. cit., pp. 611 and 145-146; The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual, op. cit., p. 25; and a working organizational chart of the Department of Defense utilized within the Office of Naval Operations, copy held by candidate.

[82]National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 20.

[83]Nicholas, op. cit., p. 25.

abbreviated form the organizational chart, figure 3, which is provided on the following page.[91]

The primary support for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the area of military strategy and policy, was provided by the assignment of the Joint Staff. The mission of the Joint Staff was to be coordinated and guided by the director of the Joint Staff who, in turn, was to be assisted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. All duties undertaken by the Staff were to be prescribed by the Joint Chiefs or the Chairman.[92] The Staff was organized on a joint service basis and along functional lines. The components' staff divisions consisted of 1) personnel directorate, 2) intelligence directorate, 3) operations directorate, 4) logistics directorate, 5) plans and policy directorate, 6) communications electronics directorate, a military assistance directorate, a joint strategic survey group.[93]

Although the military composition of the Joint Staff was originally limited to one hundred officers, this number

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[91]Sources for constructing Joint Chiefs of Staff organization chart were Government Reorganization Manual, op. cit., pp. 611 and 143-146; The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual, op. cit., p. 151 and a working organizational chart of the Defense Department utilized within the Office of Naval Operations, copy held by candidate.

[92]National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 25.

[93]Hammond, op. cit., p. 25.

Figure 2. JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF ORGANIZATION


CHAIRMAN JCS
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
US REP TO MIL COMTE, MIL COM (PS) AND STANDING GROUP TO NATO
UNIFIED AND SPECIAL COMBATANT COMMANDS
US DELEGATION, INTER-AMERICAN DEFENSE BOARD
US MILITARY REP PERM JOINT US – CAN BOARD OF DEFENSE
US SECT, JOINT US-MEX DEFENSE COM
US SECT, MILITARY COOPERATION COMMITTEE
DIRECTOR, DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY
DIRECTOR DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY
J-1 PERSONNEL
J-2 INTELLIGENCE
J-3 OPERATIONS
J-4 LOGISTICS
JOINT SECRETARIAT
ADMIN SERVICES
J-5 PLANS & POLICY
J-6 COMUN-ELECTRONIC
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
JOINT PROGRAMS
JOINT ADVANCE STUDY GROUP
CHIEF JOINT COM AND CONTROL REQUIRE GROUP

was increased to its present statutory limit of four hundred officers.[84] The personnel strength of the Joint Staff as of October 31, 1966, consisted of 432 military and 224 civilians. The total employment for all Joint Chiefs of Staff activities, including the Joint Staff, consists of 1,289 military personnel and 459 civilian employees.[85]

Criticisms of the Joint Chiefs Organization

The primary criticism of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has concerned the nature of "committee" decision. The requirement for unanimity to give high credence or prestige to decisions leads to a considerable degree of policy dilution through compromise which may not be in the best interest of national security.[86] General Taylor, speaking from experience, very candidly described this aspect of weakness in the Joint Chiefs' nature when he said:

> The Joint Chiefs of Staff have all the faults of a committee in settling important controversial matters. They must consider and accommodate many divergent views before action can be taken. In seeking unanimity, they spend much time overcoming dissent. For instance, we argued for months before reaching agreement over the allocation by service of the important assignments in the Joint Staff after its reorganization had been authorized by

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[84] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 20.

[85] "Civilian and Military Personnel," loc. cit.

[86] Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

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[84] National Security Act of 1947, op. cit., p. 30.

[85] "Civilian and Military Personnel," loc. cit.

[86] Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Progress and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 156-157.

> Congress in 1958. When compromise fails, then additional time is required to prepare the contending positions for presentation to the Secretary of Defense.[87]

Another criticism has been offered that the Joint Chiefs exercise a monopoly on the presentation of alternates. This leaves the less-experienced civilians, especially Congressmen and the public, in the position of either accepting or rejecting a policy rather than providing a choice.[88]

Criticism also takes the form that few new ideas can be generated in an organization which emphasizes discipline and chain of command. Under these conditions, the best which can be expected are improvements on old policies or the maintenance of the status quo.[89]

These criticisms are not an inclusive summary of faults. However, they do represent the most significant aspects of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as prime military strategists within the national security policy process.

In the preceding sections, a general overview of the unification conflict, the unification act, and Department

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[87] Taylor, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

[88] Lewis A. Dexter, "Congressmen and the Making of Military Policy," Components of Defense Policy, ed. Davis B. Bobrow (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1965), pp. 102-103.

[89] Robert H. Ginsburg, "The Challenge to Military Professionalism," Components of Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 139.

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[89] Bobrow et. al. discussed, "The Challenge to Military Traditionalism," Components of Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 119.

of Defense organization has been presented in order that environment and actors, within the national security policy arena, can be related to their proper perspectives. The conditions which presently exist can best be summarized as a continuing conflict of interest among the three armed services, between the individual and collective services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and, to some extent, between the objective and subjective proponents of military control. There is every indication that the Secretary of Defense has strengthened considerably the civilian leadership and control of the military; however, military influence has not been radically degraded because the overall horizons for military influence have widened.

The next chapter will focus attention on the range and types of military involvement in the nation's security policy.

# CHAPTER IV

## MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY

> The boundary between foreign and domestic policy has almost been erased. Foreign policy, military policy, and economic policy are now intimately linked. The United States has relations with over 100 countries, mutual defense treaties with over 40, and participates in scores of regional and international organizations. Policy must be made and executed in the context of fast-moving and world shaking events . . . .[1]

The blurring of the lines between military, foreign, and domestic policy increases the significance of the actors performing in the national security policy milieu. The military's involvement in the national security policy process generates particular interest because the subject is not restricted to the vital role of defense posture. Nearly all discussions of the military's role eventually must take into account such side interests as militarism, the military mind, and the seeking of military solutions to political questions. The question of the military having a role is seldom raised. Military involvement in policy formulation and implementation has become a fact of American defense; however, the degree of involvement is a controversial issue and warrants study.

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[1]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security: Basic Issues, a study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 1.

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President Kennedy recognized the need for broad military involvement in national security affairs when, after speaking of the military's responsibilities in purely military matters, he stated:

> The nonmilitary problems which you will face will also be most demanding, diplomatic, political and economic. In the years ahead, some of you will serve as advisors to foreign aid missions or even to foreign governments. Some will negotiate terms of a cease-fire with broad political as well as military ramifications. Some of you will go to the far corners of the earth, and to the far reaches of space. Some of you will sit in the highest councils of the Pentagon. Others will hold delicate command posts which are international in character. Still others will advise on plans to abolish arms instead of using them to abolish others. Whatever your position, the scope of your decisions will not be confined to the traditional tenets of military competence and training. You will need to know and understand not only the foreign policy of the United States, but the foreign policy of all countries scattered around the world . . . . You will be involved in economic judgments which most economists would hesitate to make.[2]

The observations made by the President in 1962 reflected the obvious involvement of the military in the national security process. If one accepts the broader connotation of national security policy as affecting the domestic economic and political areas as well as the overt

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[2]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security: Selected Papers, Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 18. Hereafter referred to as Administration of National Security: Selected Papers.

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elements of national defense, then the influence of the military exerts a far greater effect than that normally recognized. This influence can be seen easily in the policy planning and implementation stages and also becomes apparent when some factors of "non-military" domestic area are evaluated.

## I. MILITARY INFLUENCE IN POLICY PLANNING

The requirement for military participation in formulating national military plans was explicitly recognized by the "National Security Act of 1947."[3] According to the military definition, the purpose of planning concerns "the forecasting, programming, and coordination of a logical sequence of events which, if successful, will accomplish the commander's mission."[4] The elements of effective planning, therefore, presupposes that the military commander's mission or goal has been concretely articulated by his superiors. In the case of national military strategy, this assignment of goals must come ultimately from the President

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[3]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, National Security Act of 1947, as amended through September 20, 1966, Committee Print, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), p. 19.

[4]Jack D. Nicholas et al., The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Company, 1959), p. 105.

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[4]Jack D. Ataylor et al., The Joint and Combined Staff Officers Manual (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Telegraph Press Company, 1951), p. 103.

of the United States. Even if military strategy is primarily based on non-military objectives, the fact has been recognized that "despite the politicalization of strategy, military power is still a dominant reality in the present conflict [cold war] and the key underpinning of American Policy."[5] Further recognition of the importance of military planning was implicitly stated by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., when he said:

> It is now evident that military power becomes the master of foreign policy not when there is too much of it but when there is too little. It is the absence of lopsidedness of armed strength that allows the military situation to run foreign affairs. When our military policy is inadequate to meet a variety of crisis, our foreign policy must become constrained, rigid, and inflexible. Balanced and ample military power is consequently the price we must pay for freedom of national action.[6]

Although the military exerts considerable influence in national security policy through implementation of policy and the maintenance of necessary military force for implementation of policy, their greatest influence is in direct participation in policy formulation. These efforts are primarily military in nature but some degree of political character cannot be overlooked.

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[5]William R. Kintner, "The Politicalization of Strategy," National Security, ed. David M. Abshire (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 381.

[6]Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., "Military Force: How Much and Where?," The Reporter, IX (August 4, 1953), 13.

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Professional Expertise in Military Strategy

Huntington described expertise as:

> The skill of the officer is neither a craft . . . nor an art . . . . It is instead an extraordinarily complex intellectual skill requiring comprehensive study and training. It must be remembered that the peculiar skill of the officer is the management of violence not the act of violence itself.[7]

The military's expertise allows them to contribute their special knowledge and skills to the decision-making process in an advisory capacity, but expertise does not carry an obligation that the advice be incorporated into national policy.[8] The degree to which military advice is adhered to depends upon the atmosphere in which it is tendered and the prestige of the adviser. In times of potential military crisis, the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff take on a more significant relevance. This situation was prominent in the 1950's when the National Security Council found itself more and more concerned with military matters. According to Raymond: "The military's long range objectives became a controlling factor . . . that could hardly be altered after all the exhausting work and hard fought compromises that went into them." He went

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[7]Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1957), p. 18.

[8]Burton Sapin, Richard C. Snyder and H. W. Bruck, An Appropriate Role for the Military in American Foreign Policy-Making: A Research Note (Princeton University Organizational Behavioral Section, July, 1954), pp. 20-21.

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on to say that "once the premise of military crisis was established anyway, the influence of the military experts was substantial."[9]

Professional expertise directly involves the military leadership in broad national policy. The degree of involvement is controlled or limited by the broad policy goals determined by the political leadership. During the Eisenhower Administration, the basic policy was determined by the National Security Council and delivered to the armed forces as an annual paper, entitled "Basic National Security Policy." The Joint Chiefs translated the basic document into broad military policy in the shape of plans and programs to support the approved national policy. This planning produced the military forces necessary to implement the policy and the budget formulation necessary to support the plans and programs. The military document which expressed basic military policy was the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan."[10] Under this system, military involvement in the implementation of national security policy was clearly defined. However, the degree of influence wielded by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs as adviser to the National Security Council in the determination of the contents of

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[9]Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 243.

[10]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), p. 22.

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the "Basic National Security Policy" document can only be speculated.

Some changes in the means of providing the military with overall national policy goals were made when President Kennedy took office. The annual "Basic National Security Policy" document was discontinued. However, McGeorge Bundy, in a letter to Senator Jackson dated September 4, 1961, indicated that policy determinations were still passed to Government departments although in a less formal manner.[11] Regardless of the system used, military policy works within the framework of national policy directives and is still primarily the responsibility of the military leadership.

The degree of direct involvement of the military in national security policy can best be realized by observing the scope of their involvement in activities and agencies concerned with national defense and foreign policy. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for basic military policy and strategy to support national policy goals. Additionally, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the primary adviser to the President on military matters. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., USN, Retired, attends, in an advisory role, all meetings of the National Security

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[11] Administration of National Security, Selected Papers, op. cit., pp. 5-8.

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[11] Destabilization of National Security, Interim Report, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

Council, as does the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.[12] As principal advisers within their fields and as Presidential appointees, the counsel of these two military officers must be considered as influential not only in support of national policy but also in its formulation.

At a lower or staff level, military officers hold positions through which policy proposals, and other recommendations affecting national security must be channeled to the proper decision makers. The chart on the following page, Figure 3, indicates to some degree the military's involvement.[13] All of these military personnel are not directly concerned with broad aspects of national security policy formulation or implementation; however, their assignments place them in a position to persuade or influence their civilian superiors on broad policy matters as well as the routine aspects of their assignments. Another significant point which should be noted is that all the assignments noted on the chart are outside the normally recognized military establishment--the Army, Navy, and Air Force Departments.

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[12] Ibid., p. 38.

[13] Chart compiled from Department of Defense "Civilian and Military Personnel," working papers for fiscal year 1968 budget, 1 December 1966. Copies held by candidate. Hereafter referred to as "Civilian and Military Personnel."

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[12]Ibid., p. 28.

[13]Chart compiled from Department of Defense "Civilian and Military Personnel Working Papers for Fiscal Year 1969 Budget," 3 December 1968. Copies held by candidate. Hereafter referenced to as "Civilian and Military Personnel."

| OFFICE OR AGENCY | MILITARY OFFICERS ASSIGNED |
|---|---|
| Secretary of Defense | 2 |
| Deputy Secretary of Defense | 2 |
| Director of Defense Research and Engineering | 173 |
| Assistant Secretary (Administration) | 154 |
| Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) | 10 |
| Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) | 43 |
| Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) | 81 |
| Assistant Secretary (Manpower) | 59 |
| Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) | 101 |
| Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) | 52 |
| Special Staff Assistants | 54 |
| Defense Atomic Support Agency | 1,126 |
| Defense Communications Agency | 473 |
| Defense Intelligence Agency | 1,445 |
| Defense Supply Agency | 1,008 |
| International Military Activities | 40 |
| Offices and Agencies Outside DOD | 1,367 |

Figure 3

Military Officer Corps Assignment, Outside the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, September-November, 1966

| OFFICE OF AGENCY | PAGE |
|---|---|
| Office of the Secretary of Defense | 1 |
| Deputy Secretary of Defense | 3 |
| Director of Defense Research and Engineering | 173 |
| Assistant Secretary (Administration) | 174 |
| Assistant Secretary (Comptroller) | 12 |
| Assistant Secretary (Installations and Logistics) | 43 |
| Assistant Secretary (International Security Affairs) | 61 |
| Assistant Secretary (Manpower) | 79 |
| Assistant Secretary (Public Affairs) | 361 |
| Assistant Secretary (Systems Analysis) | 67 |
| Special Staff Assistants | 34 |
| Defense Atomic Support Agency | 1,139 |
| Defense Communications Agency | 173 |
| Defense Intelligence Agency | 1,449 |
| Defense Supply Agency | 1,008 |
| International Military Activities | 49 |
| Civilian and Military Activities DOD | 1,367 |



Military Office Corps Assignment, Outside the Department of the Army, Navy, and Air Force
September-December, 1966

Within the military establishment, a transition has occurred in the concept of military strategy and military involvement. Part of this change was reflected in General Gavin's explanation of why there should be a greater military voice in national strategy. He observed that the military role as tactician was not a controversial issue and that "general war will . . . be a war involving the entire earth as a tactical theater." Therefore, strategy must be brought into accord with capabilities and the military leadership was best suited to determine capability.[14] Another significant departure from the traditional involvement of the military in broad policy determination is reflected in the growth of politico-military affairs sections in all three military service organizations. In the Navy, this organization is integrated into the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations. The Army and the Air Force have similar sections which work under the Secretaries' Offices. These groups are primarily concerned with the implications of military actions on the political situation and vice versa.

The role of military expertise in national strategy has recently come under fire from several quarters. First,

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[14]James Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harpers and Brothers, Publishers, 1958), pp. 213-217.

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there has been increasing civilian intrusion in the military strategy field since the end of World War II. This intrusion, in the form of civilian "think" factories, was primarily the result of the new emphasis being placed on the scientific approach and the recognition that many strategic problems better lend themselves to objective study utilizing computers than to analysis based on past military experience.[15] The quantum jump in weapons development has also encouraged civilian intrusion in military strategy on the basis that now, more than ever before, military strategy must be closely coordinated and subjugated to political policy. A stronger civilian control and direction of the military establishment has also contributed to more civilian influence in military strategy. This influence, especially in the area of weapons selection, necessarily forces the military leadership to formulate its strategic concepts on the basis of available technological capabilities.

Civilian intrusion into the area traditionally reserved for military expertise has been the basis for much of the friction between the military establishment and its

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[15]Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," American Defense Policy, ed. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 188-189.

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concepts on the basis of available technological capabili-
ties.

forces the military leadership to formulate its strategic
civilian influence in military strategy." This influence,
especially in the area of weapons selection, necessarily
the military establishment has also contributed to more
only must be closely coordinated and subjugated to politi-
cal policy. A stronger civilian control and direction of
the basic idea that now, more than ever before, military strat-
also encouraged civilian intrusion in military strategy on
experience."[15] The quantum jump in weapons development has
utilizing computers than to analyze based on past military
cepts precludes better land themselves to objective study
the scientific approach and the recognition that many strate-
primarily the result of the new emphasis being placed on
intrusion, in the form of civilian "think" factories, was
tary strategy field since the end of world war II." This

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[15] Samuel P. Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," American Defense Policy, ed. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 120-123.

civilian leadership since World War II. This condition must be considered as a possible stimuli for expanding military political action. While content to work within broad national policy determined by civilian policy makers, the military resent civilian determination of military capability and broad military policy. Thus, efforts have been directed toward influencing Congress and the public in the strategy area.

One of the courses of action which has been followed by the military establishment to counteract the intrusion of civilian specialists into the military policy process has been to enlarge the number of specialists within the officer corps. This course was also the result of an obvious need for better-trained officers in a period of rapid technological change; however, it has been used to oppose the argument that experience alone does not prepare the military man to formulate military policy heavily constrained by political objectives. As an example of the new look in military education, the Navy Officer Corps included 43,784 officers with Baccalaureate degrees, 1,797 officers with significant post-graduate work, and 5,401 officers holding Master's degrees as of January 1, 1966. At the same time, several hundred officers held Doctorate degrees, and these figures do not include over five thousand M.D.'s and D.D.S.'s.[16]

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[16]Memorandum from the Office of Naval Personnel (PERS-C31a) dated 1 January 1967.

include over five thousand N.C.O.s and O.D.T.'s,[19]
as of January 1, 1966. At the same time, several hundred
officers held doctorate degrees, and three fifths of the
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The military services have also geared inservice schools to train their senior officers in politico-military matters. Among the schools are well-respected institutions such as the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College. All these institutions are designed to improve the expertise of the military officer by providing them "with a broad educational preparation for higher policy making, command and staff assignments within the national security structure."[17] The service academies have changed their curricula in the postwar era to include a broader study in the social sciences with the same idea of improving the background of future policy makers.

Turning to some of the practical aspects of military expertise in national security policy, one only has to scan the news media to see the most obvious involvements of military leadership. There is a dramatic involvement in the Viet Nam Conflict. But the particular political circumstances in that war have rendered even tactical decisions open to military-civilian strategic dispute. This situation finds ranking officers in the war zone as well as the Joint

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[17]Office of the Federal Register, United States Government Organization Manual 1966-67 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 212-213. Hereafter referred to as Government Organization Manual.

the military services have also created increasing schools to train their senior officers in politico-military matters. Among the schools are well-respected institutions such as the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the Armed Forces Staff College. All these institutions are designed to improve the competence of the military officer by providing them with a broad educational preparation for higher policy making, command and staff assignments within the national security structure.[17] The service academies have changed their curricula in the postwar era to include a broader study in the social sciences with the same idea of improving the background of future policy makers.

Turning to some of the practical aspects of military cooperation in national security policy, one only has to scan the news media to see the most obvious involvements of military leadership. There is a dramatic involvement in the Viet Nam Conflict. Not the particular political circumstances in that war have created some rancorous debate open to military-civilian interchange disputes. This situation finds retired officers in the war zone as well as the joint

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[17]Office of the Federal Register, United States Government Organization Manual 1966-67 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 212-213. Hereinafter referred to as Government Organization Manual.

Chiefs differing with the civilian leadership. Such matters as cease-fire in the war for holidays have been criticized by the military as detrimental to combat effectiveness.[18] The debate among National Security Council Members over the effects and wisdom of the bombing of North Viet Nam, which reportedly pits the Joint Chiefs, the Secretary of State, and the President's special assistant for National Security Affairs against the Secretary of Defense and other opponents of the bombing strategy and tactics, also reflects an interesting military-political involvement.[19] While military involvement through advisers in Southeast Asia has been well publicized, there have been reports of similar activities in Latin America.[20] The role of the military in aiding other nations in their counter-insurgency activities has a far greater political impact than its military function suggests. The sale of arms to foreign nations also involves the military and has a bearing on national security policy. The Joint Chiefs have been deeply involved in both the military and political aspects of the controversy of troop withdrawals from Europe.[21]

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[18] Article in The Washington Post, December 13, 1966.

[19] Ibid., December 21, 1966.

[20] Ibid., December 13, 1966.

[21] Ibid., December 21, 1966.

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[18] Article in The Washington Post, December 13, 1966.

[19] Ibid., December 31, 1966.

[20] Ibid., December 13, 1966.

[21] Ibid., December 31, 1966.

Civilian-Military Policy Coordination

Part of the expanded military involvement in national security policy was caused by the degree of policy coordination required in the policy process. In order to gain a perspective of policy coordination problems, one only has to review the previously discussed high-level organizational efforts directed to this end. The National Security Council was the first organization specifically designed for policy coordination. The Operations Coordinating Board supplemented the National Security Council, and this was followed by President Kennedy's ad hoc task group method. The latest effort has generated the newly-established Senior Interdepartmental Group of the Johnson Administration.

The same problem of policy coordination exists at most levels in the national security policy process. Some idea of military involvement in the policy coordination area can be gleaned from the fact that over one thousand military officers are retained by departments other than Defense.[22] These personnel are utilized for military expertise as well as pure policy coordination, but the end result is the same inasmuch as they provide the military viewpoint on national security policy.

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[22]"Military and Civilian Personnel," loc. cit.

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[12] "Military and Civilian Personnel," loc. cit.

Some of the more important instances of involvement of officers in the coordination process include the military men who hold positions in the Department of State's Policy Planning Council,[23] the representatives of the Joint Chiefs who sit on Interdepartmental Regional Group conferences, the military representatives on the Disarmament Commission, the officers who hold Congressional liaison positions and the military advisers to the various ambassadors. This group was cited because they reflect those positions closest to the policy process.

In each case of policy coordination, there is the ever-present potential of further military involvement in aspects of the problem being considered. The case of the Agency for International Development in South Viet Nam provides a good example of coordination problems which saw the military taking on additional responsibilities in an area designated as State Department responsibility. In this particular instance, the military Assistance Command, Viet Nam, increased its activities and authority largely because the AID mission was unable to meet the requirements of the pacification program without military assistance.[24]

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[23]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearing before its Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 573.

[24]Article in The Washington Post, December 11, 1966.

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[13] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, The Role of the National Security Staff, Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1968 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1968), p. 573.

[14] Article in The Washington Post, December 11, 1966.

Perhaps the most important point of coordination and military involvement is at the top of the military hierarchy. This is undoubtedly true in the case of basic policy formulation. All State Department proposals are reviewed by the Joint Chiefs on the basis of capability implementation as previously discussed. However, the Department of Defense's International Security Affairs Office reviews and comments on all State Department proposals, and over 25 per cent of its staff are in uniform. The International Security Affairs Office, as well as the Joint Chiefs, originate policy proposals both in conjunction with and separately from the Department of State.

Military involvement in national security policy can also be the result of a breakdown in the coordination process. Some of the best known examples of this aspect of the policy coordination problem involves statements by military figures which were not cleared through the proper channels. General MacArthur's statement which led to his recall was one such incident. In this statement, the General called for total victory while the Administration was trying to find a basis for compromise.[25] Another prime example concerned the 1956 publication of a plan by Admiral Radford,

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[25]Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), pp. 160-171.

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the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to curtail military commitments in Europe. The effect of the statement was to contradict and embarrass the head of a foreign state and to strain what had otherwise been an excellent relationship between Secretary of State Dulles and Chancellor Adenauer.[26]

Lesser problems involving lack of policy coordination occur frequently and add to the confusion which necessarily exists in the large and complex national security policy process. Such problems have been cited as the occasion when the Air Force launched over two hundred of the large meteorological balloons at the height of the Soviet campaign against all types of balloons and in contradiction to a program of non-antagonism being pursued by the United States Information Agency. The political repercussions of an ill-timed press release on research and development of bacteriological and chemical warfare just before the President sent his major disarmament proposals to the United Nations is another example of blunder through lack of coordination.[27]

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[26]Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Goblentz, Duel at the Brink (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1960), pp. 45-46.

[27]The American Assembly, The Representation of the United States Abroad (New York: Columbia University, 1956), p. 115.

## II. MILITARY AS POLICY IMPLEMENTERS

In the strictest sense, only the President can make the decisions which determine the nation's security policy. However, in practice, the President relies a great deal on policy recommendations and generally can be said to choose between broad policy alternatives. Within the framework of national security goals, the various government departments and agencies formulate their particular policies to implement the policies of the President. For the military, the implementation of United States security policy primarily involves the maintenance of sufficient military capability to preserve the physical integrity of the nation and to provide sufficient military force to support the nation's foreign policy objectives.

### Guardians of Security

The military forces of the nation have as their primary mission the physical security of the nation. Prior to World War II, the natural defenses provided by the two oceans and traditionally impotent neighbors restricted the need for extended military protection or foreign alliances. The development of long-range aircraft and then missiles added a third dimension to territorial defense. The concept of vertical defense and long-range attack capabilities drastically changed the parameters in which military policy

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### Protection of Security

The military forces of the nation have as their primary mission the physical security of the nation. Prior to World War II, the natural defenses provided by the two oceans and traditionally important neighbors restricted the need for extended military protection or foreign alliances. The development of long-range aircraft and then missiles added a third dimension to territorial defense. The continent of vertical maritime and long-range attack capabilities drastically changed the parameters in which military policy

operates. These developments coincided with and complemented the changing concepts of the United States political role in world affairs.

The effects of the changing concepts of security needs directly involved the utilization of the military forces of the United States. The military leadership, therefore, became involved in the implementation of a drastically expanded security policy. The most significant involvement related to the building of sufficient military capability to allow a more flexible and effective foreign policy without weakening the national defense force. The road taken to provide sufficient military capability was rough and slow, but the end results have seen the emergence of adequate military strength to permit military commitments around the globe in support of political objectives. Today's conflict in Viet Nam, troops in Europe, Asia, and scattered outposts throughout the rest of the world present a far different picture than that described by the first Secretary of Defense in September, 1947. At that time and in the face of imminent occupation of Trieste by Yugoslavia, Secretary Forrestal registered his apprehension of the President's order to reinforce the American garrison in Trieste because insufficient military forces were available for even their existing commitments.[28]

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[28]Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 313-314.

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[28]Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), pp. 414-415.

Military involvement in national security policy has been most obvious in the rebuilding of military capability since the end of World War II. The conflicts among the services and between the services and the various Administrations were reflective of military involvement in policy implementation because military capability often determines the means utilized to obtain the national objectives. The arguments which surrounded the "48 versus the 70" group Air Force involved the Air Force in a continuous struggle for several years in an attempt to build a sufficient air capability to implement the then existing policy of deterrence.[29] The Army's struggle for increased personnel during the lean 1950's reflected a similar involvement in policy implementation. This involvement saw the Army Chiefs of Staff fighting both the other service chiefs and the Administration for the capability to implement deterrence through what was to become known as "flexible response."[30]

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[29]United States Congress, Senate Document No. 204, Mobilization Planning and the National Security: Problems and Issues, Prepared by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950), pp. 86-90.

[30]Taylor, op. cit., p. 23. The theme to which General Taylor constantly refers throughout his book is the conflict and frustrations in national policy implementation although, at times, the lines between policy planning, implementation and strategy are marginally defined.

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[30]Taylor, op. cit., p. 23. The terms be using General Taylor consistently refers throughout his book in the conflict and frustrations in national policy implementation although, at times, the lines between policy planning, implementation and strategy are practically defined.

Involvement of the military in policy implementation at the higher levels tend to overlap into policy planning. This occurs because capability must be constantly reviewed and evaluated by policy planners to determine the relevancy of existing policy and possible modifications required to further security goals. Therefore, military involvement in planning and actions to implement national security policy sometimes appear to be the case of the military policy tail wagging the national policy dog.

At other levels, military involvement in the implementation process has a much clearer definition, but spillover or feedback can still influence the course of national security policy. There are obvious examples of this aspect of involvement, such as the functions of military intelligence, the role of the military commander making the vital decision as to what constitutes an overt act of aggression in some far-flung outpost, and the military decision that certain foreign bases are vital to military capability or that certain positions are no longer defendable.

Military Aid and Missions

The incorporation of military aid and advisory missions have become institutionalized in United States national security policy. The military operation and administration of the program has not been challenged although the overall program has received its share of criticism.

The scope of military involvement in this area of policy implementation reached its peak during the rebuilding of allied military strength in Europe and Turkey and then decreased to its present level. The monetary value appropriated for the program has averaged 1.55 billion dollars since 1962.[31]

The military aid program has also evolved from its original concept of supplying friendly nations with arms and technical training in the use of these arms for external security to a more political function. Latin America is now receiving almost $100 million annually, and this military assistance, according to Secretary McNamara, "continues to be oriented toward internal security and civic action."[32]

Military aid has a direct and obvious effect on the security posture of the receiving nation. Additionally, the program places United States military officers in a position of close relations with the military elites of participating nations. This aspect becomes especially significant when one considers that, in areas where military aid

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[31]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. on S.2950, February 23-March 31, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 230-231. Hereafter referred to as Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967.

[32]Ibid., p. 38.

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[31] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. on S.3520, February 23-March 11, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 230-231. Hereafter referred to as Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967.

[32] Ibid., p. 39.

is most necessary, military elites or cliques are often the strongest political force in the determination of national policy. Latin America and Southeast Asia are prime examples of areas where military aid operations could have a potentially important effect on United States security policy.

Policy Representatives

Military participation in the implementation of national security policy often takes the role of representatives of the national government. A wide range of military activities could be classified under the heading of policy representation, including many of the functions previously mentioned under other categories. However, policy representation occupies a primary function of some military officers and deserves special coverage.

In the past, military participation as policy representatives has included such roles as military governors and treaty negotiators. These functions still occur periodically; however, they have lost their primacy to institionalized representative functions. The most important policy representatives are those officers assigned to tasks in relation to the alliances.

The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is a significant policy representative of the United States Government. According to General Norstad, the senior American Officer in the NATO military system often finds himself concerned with

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The Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, is a significant policy representative of the United States government. According to General Norstad, the senior American officer in the NATO military system often finds himself concerned with

political matters as well as command functions.[33] This aspect must be equally applicable to subordinate commanders in the NATO system, such as the Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, and the Commander in Chief, Southern Europe. United States representatives to the Military Committee and the Standing Group of NATO also reflect the nation's security policy in their formulation of NATO's strategic and military policies.[34]

Military representation in other treaty organizations, such as the Organization of American States and the South-East Treaty Organization, also reflects military involvement in policy implementation.

Yet, policy representation is not always restricted to lofty levels. Actions or even the presence of military commanders and the private soldier in a foreign nation may be interpreted by government leadership of public opinion as reflecting United States policy. Thus, the presence of American troops in Europe came to be recognized as assurance of United States policy to become involved in military

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[33]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Atlantic Alliance, Hearings before its Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., May 5-6, 1966 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1966), pp. 65-90.

[34]The South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Collective Security: Shield of Freedom (Bangkok, Thailand: Published by SEATO, 1963), p. 70.

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[33] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Organization of Military Establishments, Hearings before its subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., May 2-4, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 80-90.

[34] The South-East Asia Treaty Organization, Objectives, Security, Shield of Freedom (Bangkok, undated: published by SEATO, 1962), p. 10.

action before the destruction of Europe could be effected by a possible Russian attack.[35] The deportment of troops has a significance in relations which affect security policy. This significance has been recognized and made the subject of past study. One such study, the investigation by the Bendetsen Committee from the Department of Defense, pointed out that "the only face of America which countless foreigners see is a military face: by it they tend to judge our nation." The committee went on to report that the military face had been found representative of the United States and a credit to the nation.[36]

## III. THE SUBTLE INFLUENCE

The choice of "The Subtle Influence" as a sub-heading may be considered by many as a misnomer or even an act of naiveté. However, even with the obvious influence of defense spending, publicity surrounding the military effort and interaction of domestic and military policy, the threat to the "American way of life," whatever that may be, is less dangerous in the short run than alarmists have predicted. Again, it is necessary to differentiate between

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[35]Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 16-17.

[36]Gavin, op. cit., p. 135.

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[35]Morton H. Halperin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), pp. 13-17.

[36]Levin, op. cit., p. 133.

the military officer corps and the militarists who may or may not be connected with the military officer corps but definitely do not dominate this group.

Public Opinion

The military has a definite interest in maintaining a good public image. The military budget is dependent upon convincing Congress directly and the public indirectly that all monies requested will be effectively employed for national security. The recruitment and retention of a leadership corps depends upon the public image maintained by the military. And major differences in strategic concepts rely, to some extent, on the prestige and respect held by the military leadership.

At one time, the correct image could be expressed for all military purposes in the simple but poignant creed of West Point--"Duty, Honor, Country." This creed, so well exemplified by the hero generals and admirals of World War II, lost much of its lustre by the early 1960's. The glamorous hero fell before the onrush of technology and had to be replaced by the image of the professional soldier as a specialist in administration, diplomacy, business, engineering and many other skills. At the same time, it was necessary to maintain the aura of a broad general experience

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to increase the credibility of the military leadership in the strategic area.[37]

The problems of creating a totally successful image appear of impossible magnitude. Yet, the military receives strong aid in the form of residual hero worship from World War II. The establishment also maintains public relations offices which strive to reflect the correct image.[38] Successive Administrations have also supported the prestige and expertise of the military leadership for the expediency of policy legitimacy.[39] Another source of support has been that given by members of Congress who have utilized military opponents of Administration policy when the opposition coincided with that existing in Congress.[40] Additionally, the military have enjoyed a demand for their services as orators because national security is a vital public issue and because the tradition of military non-partisanism makes these speakers broadly acceptable.

The military establishment cooperates with a wide range of media for purposes of public opinion. The motion

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[37]Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," op. cit., pp. 184-185 and 193.

[38]Raymond, op. cit., p. 201.

[39]Gavin, op. cit., p. 168.

[40]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 147.

to increase the credibility of the military leadership in the strategic area.[37]

The problems of creating a totally successful image appear of impossible magnitude. Yet, the military received strong aid in the form of retired hero worship from World War II. The establishment also maintains cordial relations offices which strive to reflect the correct image.[38] Successive administrations have also supported the prestige and expertise of the military leadership for the expediency of policy legitimacy.[39] Another source of support has been that given by members of Congress who have utilized military opponents of Administration policy when the opposition coincided with that existing in Congress.[40] Additionally, the military have enjoyed a demand for their services as workers because national security is a vital public issue and because the creation of military non-participants makes those procedures broadly acceptable.

The military establishment cooperates with a wide range of media for purposes of public opinion. The motion

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[37]Huntington, "Power Expertise and the Military Profession," op. cit., pp. 164-165 and 169.

[38]Raymond, op. cit., p. 101.

[39]Davis, op. cit., p. 169.

[40]Samuel P. Huntington, "Interests Peogroups and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, op. cit., p. 147.

picture industry has found the military most cooperative in producing movies which reflect the military profession in a favorable light. News columnists who are sympathetic to military policy appear to enjoy extra sources of policy information in the form of news "leaks." Professional military journals and newspapers are also valuable links in the process of image building.

The process of building the proper image in the public's mind has not been too successful even with so many factors in the military's favor. In this respect, the officer corps has been its own worst enemy. The fierce conflicts over unification and continuing differences in strategic concepts have cast doubt in the public's mind as to the true degree of military expertise in the nation's policy process. The occasional charges of conflict of interest which have been leveled against high-ranking military officers linger in the public's awareness much longer than do the unspectacular public relations news handouts. The activities of retired officers who have become leaders of the "radical right" also make better news coverage than the vast majority of retired officers who have taken a more moderate political stand and have blended productively into civilian life.

The military's reliance on a favorable public opinion for personnel recruitment and retention, budgetary

picture industry has found the military most cooperative in producing movies which reflect the military profession in a favorable light. Many columnists who are sympathetic to military policy appear to enjoy extra sources of policy information in the form of news "leaks." Professional military journals and newspapers are also valuable allies in the process of image building.

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The military's reliance on a favorable public opinion for increased recruitment and retention, however,

requirements, and policy support necessitates involvement in this area. Yet, the requirement to project a good public image may impair the effectiveness of military expertise in those cases where political expediency is practiced to retain a favorable public opinion. Additionally, too much or improper involvement in the molding of public opinion could backfire and leave the impression that the military establishment is just another narrow based pressure group.

Economic Impact

Spending for national defense has reached an awesome level. The appropriations requested by the Secretary of Defense in March, 1966, for fiscal year 1967 exceeded 59 billion dollars.[41] And a supplemental request was later necessary to meet rising costs of the conflict in Viet Nam. The sheer magnitude of the sums involved in supporting the nation's military power has caused considerable concern for its impact on the overall national economy as well as specific areas such as welfare spending and the concentration of prosperity in defense industries.

The fear that huge defense budgets might drastically endanger the domestic economy has somewhat diminished on the

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[41] Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., p. 4.

military establishment is just another narrow pressure group. Opinion could backfire and leave the impression that the much or improper involvement in the economy in order to retain a favorable public opinion. Additionally, the time in those cases where political expediency is detected public image may impair the effectiveness of military expenditures, and policy makers encouraging the economic economy may somewhat diminished on the in this area. Yet, the requirement to develop a good

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The fear that huge defense budgets might drastically endanger the economic economy has somewhat diminished on the

basis of experiences with the Korean War and subsequent crisis spending on such matters as the space race. In these cases, it has been determined that an increased defense budget reasonably proportioned to the gross national product (GNP) does not seriously upset the national economy.[42] Yet, the spectre of a mobilized civilian economy to support the military's spending exists and the public generally accepts the thesis that the military leadership dominates the civilian economy simply through the enormity of the defense budget.

A review of statistics reveals that the military establishment is truly an economic power. For instance, in 1966, the amount of money budgeted for military personnel pay, subsistence and related expenses amounted to 16.9 billion dollars. Over 19.9 billion dollars were utilized for procurement of weapons, weapons systems, and general housekeeping items. Military construction, including family housing, accounted for over 3 billion dollars.[43] As of June, 1965, the total value of Department of Defense real and personal property amounted to 176.2 billion dollars. While the majority of this inventory, 85 billion

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[42]Henry S. Rowen, "Defense and the Economy," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 124-126.

[43]Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

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A review of statistics reveals that the military establishment is truly an economic power. For instance, in 1966, the amount of money budgeted for military personnel pay, subsistence and related expenses amounted to 10.9 billion dollars. Over 13.9 billion dollars were written for procurement of weapons, weapons systems, and general housekeeping items. Military construction, including family housing, accounted for over 3 billion dollars.[43] As of June, 1966, the total value of Department of Defense real and personal property amounted to 178.1 billion dollars. Within the majority of this inventory, 85 billion

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[42] Monty J. Bowen, "Defense and the Economy," Modern Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 124-126.

[43] Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

dollars, consisted of weapons and supporting equipment, the military establishment also owned a substantial real estate holding valued at 37.6 billion dollars and consisting of 420,000 acres of land. The value of the real estate must be considered as most conservative because estimates were based on purchase price, without appreciation. Lands donated or taken out of the public domain were not appraised or estimated but rather treated as having zero value in the total valuation. The various military services and the Department of Defense rented additional land and facilities during the year ending June 30, 1965, at a cost of 34.99 million dollars. The total land controlled by the Defense Department totaled 30.9 million acres as of June 30, 1965.[44]

Two of the four rough indices utilized by Huntington to evaluate the political influence of the military are related to economic matters. These indices include the economic and human resources available to the military leadership and the group affiliations with inservice contacts, such as industry.[45] Indiscriminate use of this

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[44]United States Department of Defense, Office of the Controller, Real and Personal Property of the Department of Defense as of 30 June 1965, Report submitted to the President and to Congress, pp. 2-3, 14-15, 22 and 35.

[45]Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pp. 88-89.

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[45] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., pp. 89-93.

concept could easily lead to an evaluation of military influence far in excess of reality. The key limitation of the concept rests in the determination of what resources are actually available to the military leadership. This aspect of evaluation appears to be missing in the statement of Professor Swomley:

> No activity of the military is more dangerous to American Democracy than its economic program. This program . . . is an illustration both of "creeping militarism" and of the military's conscious planning for power.[46]

The restraints on the availability of resources to the military leadership appear quite formidable. The budget, in which military resources ultimately rest, is by law and practice the responsibility of the civilian leadership. In addition to the budget restraints imposed by the Secretary of Defense, the Budget Bureau and Congress, the General Accounting Office also audits the utilization of resources. In this respect, the General Accounting Office is probably the most effective government check against a misuse of economic or human resources because this organization is specifically charged with detailed auditing of "administration of funds and the utilization of property and personnel."[47]

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[46] John M. Swomley, The Military Establishment (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), p. 99.

[47] Government Organization Manual, op. cit., p. 35.

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[46]Peter M. Sandman, The Military Establishment
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1971), p. 29.

[47]Government Organization Manual, 1970, p. 239.

The group affiliations of industry and the officer corps present another problem. There can be little doubt that some conflict of interest has occurred in this area. However, those cases publicized and substantiated have been questions of personal integrity rather than covert attempts to increase consciously the military influence in economic matters. When charges of interest conflict have been substantiated, severe punitive actions have resulted.[48]

The possible effects of the large number of retired military officers in defense industries has recurred periodically. Concern for this situation was the subject of Congressional hearings in the 1950's. One investigation by the Herbert Subcommittee determined that over fourteen hundred retired officers with the rank of major and above held positions in one hundred leading defense industries. Included in this number were 261 generals or admirals. One prime contractor, General Dynamics, was headed by a former Army Secretary and employed twenty-seven retired generals and admirals. Despite the numbers involved, the Herbert Subcommittee hearings produced no evidence of venality or misconduct and, at most, some cases of cloudy issues.[49]

Even though the personal integrity of a few

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[48] Raymond, op. cit., pp. 205-207.

[49] Ibid., pp. 207-210.

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The possible effects of the large number of retired

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[42] Taylor, op. cit., 30-103-107.

[43] Ibid., pp. 307-310.

individual military officers has proven inadequate in the past and the situation may be repeated in the future, the best interests of national security policy requires contacts and intercourse between the military and industry. Industry has the means of producing the innovations and discoveries which are vital to national defense in the technological era. The military has the expertise of the user which is necessary to give direction to industry's skills. The small degradation to national security caused by an occasional unethical act is far overshadowed by the overall benefits of the system.

Social Impact

The determination of specific changes in societal values from increased military involvement in national security policy cannot be measured or proven. Yet, the emergence of a new leadership group must affect the society in which it operates. The problems encountered in attempting to isolate or validate attitude transformations involve too many variables and uncertainties to make a cursory study worthwhile. However, specific involvements of the military can be noted with the logical expectation that these will act on societal values and attitudes.

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[49] Ibid., pp. 207-210.

initiated military officers has proven inadequate in the past and the situation may be created in the future, the best interests of national security policy requires coordination and interchange between the military and industry. Industry has the means of producing the innovations and discoveries which are vital to national defense in the technological era. The military has the expertise of the uses which is necessary to give direction to industry's skills. The small degradation to national security caused by an occasional unethical act is far overshadowed by the overall benefits of the system.

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[42] Ibid., pp. 207-210.

Perhaps, the greatest impact on social attitudes has involved the transformation in the American approach to war and the use of military power. The traditional attitude that political and military power were separate entities has changed to a recognition of the necessary balancing of military means to political ends. The latter attitude was strongly supported by the military long before World War II, but its acceptance by the American public was not forthcoming until the cold war created circumstances conducive to the creation of the National Security Council, a device specifically constructed to harmonize military power with political policy.[50]

The vast number of non-careerists who have served in the Armed Forces and then returned to society must have retained values or attitudes generated by their experiences in the military establishment. The impact of this group on society can be seen now only in the possible effects of the various veteran groups and influential individuals who openly profess certain attitudes as the result of military training. The overall impact of armed forces experiences must necessarily wait for a valid scientific study of the military mind.

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[50]Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 105-109.

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[50] Robert E. Osgood, "The American Approach to War," American Defense Policy, 3d. ed., p. 105-109.

Military involvement in educational institutions also must have some effect on society. This involvement includes the various Reserve Officers Training Corps at the University and high-school level and the research grants supplied to various colleges and universities. In the latter case, over 240 institutions received Department of Defense grants totaling more than 289 million dollars in 1965.[51] While the grants were for military research projects, the end result should aid the schools involved in a financial way and, thus, provide education to more students or improve the quality of education. The extension of grants for research and for the ROTC programs also has an adverse effect which may be lost in its subtlety. If the institution expands or makes commitments on the basis of Defense Department grants, the school has assumed a reliance on and interest in defense matters. The question then arises as to whether recipients of grants can maintain an attitude of objectivity toward the project involved or toward national security in general.

The idea of a subtle influence on American society may appear dubious in the light of the obvious impact of the defense budget. However, a democracy seldom has to

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[51] Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967, op. cit., pp. 447-449.

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[51] *Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967*, 89th Cong. 2d Sess. 414-444.

fear those functions of any societal group which operates under the glare of publicity and political and statutory restrictions. The danger to a democracy from such a group is derived from the almost hidden and never measurable effects on societal values. How long can a society bear the burden of ever-rising defense without either becoming outraged and endangering national security or becoming so conditioned to huge defense budgets that more and more political functions could be hidden in their immensity? What are the chances that increased civilian intervention in military expertise matters may cause military frustration and increased political activity on the part of the military leaders? Other questions involving the use of the military in social and economic matters and its possible effects on military and civilian values must be considered. These questions require evaluation based on long-run potentials and the answers derived must be calculated to strike a proper balance which will benefit both national security and democratic values.

The preceding discussion has considered the degree of military involvement in policy planning and implementation and national domestic life. Some of the means through which the military exert their influence have been described without recourse to evaluation to their legitimacy or propriety. The following chapter will attempt to analyze

military means of influence in order that they may form a perspective for considering an appropriate military role.

# CHAPTER V

## MEANS OF INFLUENCE AND AN APPROPRIATE MILITARY ROLE

The means by which interest groups project their influence have long been studied for indications of their effectiveness and power within the political structure. Although the military group differs in some respects from the ordinary pressure group, observation of means used to project military influence should provide a degree of validity to an analysis of their relative power position within the national security process. In turn, such an analysis should lead to the structuring of a more appropriate role for the military in the policy process.

### I. EFFECTUATING MILITARY INFLUENCE

Variations and complexities surround military efforts to influence national policy. The efforts vary from concentrated actions of the complete military establishment to efforts on the part of individual officers to influence all or some part of the nation's policy. The means used to influence policy can also vary from highly-legal and appropriate measures to efforts bordering on or submerged in illegitimacy. Observation and analysis are made more

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### I. EFFECTUATING MILITARY INFLUENCE

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difficult by the fact that, in many cases, multiple efforts which involve both proper and improper methods are prevalent.

Bearing in mind the problems involved in classification and analysis, there appear to be three predominant categories of military influence--legitimate, quasi-legitimate, and illegitimate. Legitimate influence must be defined as those efforts which are properly exerted within the national security organization as recognized by the "National Security Act of 1947" and the legally-constituted Department of Defense hierarchy. Quasi-legitimate influence pertains to the areas which cannot be closely regulated by law or directives because it involves tradition and the intangibles of personalities and political prestige. The third category of illegitimacy involves acts which are in clear opposition to legality, tradition, or ethical conduct. While the mere act of classification implies value judgment and, therefore, subjectivity, the evaluator will attempt to use only clear-cut and widely-recognized values in the following observations.

Legitimate Means of Influence

The classification of legitimacy does not imply "right" or "wrong" because, in the broader context, this judgment must be founded on whether the results benefited national security without damaging the form of government or democratic principles chosen by the electorate.

difficult by the fact that, in many cases, multiple efforts which involve both proper and improper methods are perceived.

Bearing in mind the problems involved in classification and analysis, there appear to be three predominant categories of military influence--legitimate, questionable, and illegitimate. Legitimate influence must be defined as those efforts which are properly covered within the defined executive organization as recognized by the National Security Act of 1947 and the legally-constituted Department of Defense Directive. Questionable influence pertains to the areas which cannot be closely regulated by law or directives because it involves tradition and the intangibles of personalities and political prestige. The third category of illegitimacy involves acts which are in clear opposition to legality, tradition, or ethical conduct. While the mere act of classification implies value judgment and, therefore, subjectivity, the evaluator will attempt to use only clear-cut and widely-recognized values in the following observations.

Legitimate Realm of Influence

The classification of legitimacy does not imply "right" or "wrong" because, in the broader context, this judgment must be founded on whether the results inherited national security without damaging the fabric of government or democratic principles chosen by the electorate.

Within the framework of legitimacy as reflected by the "National Security Act of 1947" and the military and civilian hierarchy of the Department of Defense, military efforts to influence national policy are limited to advice and recommendation. This function is best exemplified by the "Joint Strategic Objectives Plan" of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, many other important functions in this area have evolved in which the studies or proposals of the Joint Staff, through the Joint Chiefs or of the various military departments through their civilian secretaries, reach the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, or the President in the form of proposed policy recommendations or policy alternatives. The number of policy studies which have been requested of the military leadership is reflected in the growth of the Joint Staff from one hundred officers in 1947 to the statutory four-hundred officer limit of today.

Another aspect of legitimacy could be classified as vertical liaison. This function differs from the area of advice because it encompasses degrees of coercion or compromise which are pragmatic features of political reality. Huntington assesses this phenomenon as a general bureaucratic feature applicable to the national security hierarchy. He explains the process by noting that "as one moves up a hierarchy the links in the chain of command

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Another aspect of legitimacy could be classified as vertical liaison. This function differs from the area of advice because it encompasses degrees of coercion or compulsion which are problematic features of political reality. Huntington expresses this phenomenon as a general problematic feature applicable to the national security bureaucracy. He explains the process by noting that "as one moves up a hierarchy the links in the chain of command

weaken and even tend to dissolve."[1] Yet, this feature was implicitly recognized and, to a degree, accepted by both the Administration and Congress during various hearings on national security organization as a means of denying too much power to either the Secretary of Defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was specifically incorporated in the provision that gave service secretaries access to Congress.

Vertical liaison is not always clearly delineated. However, under certain conditions, the results of negotiations and compromise can be distinguished or interpreted over a period of time. In this respect, the continuing efforts of the Air Force to retain the manned bomber in its weapons mix clearly reflects vertical liaison. The differences between the Air Force position and that of the Administration, as reflected by Secretary McNamara, has moved ever closer to a compromise. The differences in positions taken on the manned bomber become especially clear when Secretary McNamara's testimony before Congress in 1961 and 1966 is examined.[2] The Secretary's original position of

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[1]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the Political Process," American Defense Policy, ed. Wesley W. Posvar et al. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), pp. 150-151.

[2]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year

weapon and even send to disarm."[1] Yet, this feature was implicitly recognized and, to a degree, accepted by both the Administration and Congress during various hearings on national security organization as a means of denying too much power to either the secretary of defense or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It was specifically incorporated in the provision that gave service secretaries access to Congress.

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[2] United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Military Procurement Authorization, Fiscal Year

phasing out the manned bomber changed significantly in favor of an undetermined mix of bombers and missiles, while the Air Force modified its demands for a particular bomber such as the B-70 to a plane with more versatility. The interplay between the Administration and the Air Force was recognized by the news media in the dramatic revelations of the McNamara-Lemay differences of opinion.[3] The conversion of positions was further reflected in a recent news item which indicated that Secretary of the Air Force Harold Brown, a prime figure in opposition to the manned bomber during his tenure as Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was now in favor of the manned bomber to increase United States military superiority.[4]

Vertical liaison rather than hierarchal influence was apparent in the efforts of the Joint Chiefs to determine criterion for the 1947 disarmament negotiations. In this case, the Joint Chiefs were not willing to talk about conventional weapons until nuclear disarmament had been agreed upon. Military influence, in this case, amounted to

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1962, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., April 4-19, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 82; and United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Department of Defense of the Committee on Appropriations, Military Procurement Authorizations for Fiscal Year 1967.

[3]Article in The New York Times, May 16, 1962, p. 1.

[4]Article in The Washington Post, February 3, 1967.

[illegible] was the general feeling [illegible] in favor of an unmodernized B-47 or bombers not missiles, while the Air Force maintains its demands for a penetrating bomber with the [illegible] to a place with some reputable [illegible] between the Administration and the Air Force was cancelled by the navy could in the domestic constitution of the Eisenhower-Dulles [illegible] of coalition.[3] The compromise of positions that Durfee reflected in a recent news item which indicated that Secretary of the Air Force Douglas [illegible] seems a better climate in opposition to the general course during his tenure as director of overseas bases and Eisenhower, was done in favor of the manned bomber to increase United States military superiority.[4]

Technical limitations rather than strategical influence were apparent in the defense of the Atlantic Ocean to defend [illegible] for the 1961 disarmament negotiations. In this case, the Soviet Union was not willing to talk about controlled weapons until nuclear disarmament had been agreed upon. Military influence in this case, amounted to

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[illegible] 1961, Meetings, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., April 6-14, 1961 and Disarmament, Communist Violation of Treaties and Inspection, 1961, 1- [illegible] United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services and Subcommittee on Disarmament, Inspection and Control Agreements, Hearings [illegible] Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., April 6-14, 1961.

[3]Article in The New York Times, May 18, 1961, p. 1.

[4]Article in The Washington Post, January 6, 1961.

more than simply making a recommendation because it led to conflict which had to be resolved by the President and the military's policy became national policy over the opposition of the nation's U.N. representative on disarmament.[5]

Another legitimate military means of influencing policy can be classified as horizontal liaison. In this area can be placed the military's functions of policy coordination, including testimony before Congress. Many examples of military influence through policy coordination have been previously mentioned; however, few of these cases were analyzed on the basis of legitimacy. The policy-making structure recognizes and emphasizes policy coordination and the consultative process, but not all cases of coordination fall within the realm of legitimacy. Thus, the Senior Interdepartmental Group's decision on a course of action determined on the basis of military capability analysis would be a legitimate use of influence. However, if the decision could hinge on several military contingencies and the military participants arbitrarily restrict the alternatives to favor a particular viewpoint, the legitimacy of military influence has been abrogated.

Stanley attributes the ability to exert influence in the horizontal plane as resulting from the military being

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[5]Walter Millis (ed.), The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 327.

[illegible] making a recommendation because it led to conflict which had to be resolved by the president and the military's policy became national policy over the opposition of the majority [illegible] cooperation or disagreement.[3]

Another implicit military means of influencing policy can be classified as doctrinal rivalry. In this area can be placed the military's functional or policy coordination, including doctrinal centers disputes. Many examples of military influence through policy coordination have been previously mentioned; however, few of these cases were analyzed on the basis of legitimacy. The policy making structure [illegible] and emphasizes doctrinal coordination and the constitutive process, but not all cases of coordination fall within the realm of legitimacy. Thus, the senior Intergovernmental Group's decision on a course of action determined on the basis of military capability analysis would be a legitimate use of influence. However, if the decision could hinge on several military considerations that the military participants ordinarily overrate the effectiveness to favor a particular viewpoint, the legitimacy of military influence has been exceeded.

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[3]Walter Millis [ed.], The Forrestal Diaries (New York: The Viking Press, 1951), p. 387.

activists who are willing to fill the vacuum created by the lack of civilian leadership.[6] Yet, forcefulness and decisiveness are not enough to assure influence. The military's best device for converting their civilian counterparts is the well-developed staff paper which not only takes a stand on a particular issue but also offers impressive data to back the stand. Additionally, the miliary leadership is likely to offer a well-developed program to accomplish the recommended objective.

Another means of adding prestige to military recommendations in the horizontal coordination process is the prestige of a unified military position. This aspect of military influence produces a semblance of military unification near that expected to the Unification Act. During the period from 1947 to 1956, less that 10 per cent of all Joint Chiefs of Staff actions resulted in split issues.[7] General Gavin stated that, although internal JCS disagreement over parochial issues usually resulted in a 2-1 vote, unified agreement was generally reported out in order that the decision remained a military one and, therefore, retained greater weight.[8]

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[6]Timothy W. Stanley, American Defense and National Security (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1956), p. 46.

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Programs and the Political Process," op. cit., p. 157.

[8]James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New

activists who are willing to fill the vacuum created by the lack of civilian leadership.[6] Yet, force-reliance and destructiveness are not enough to assure influence. The military's best device for converting their civilian counterparts is the well-developed staff paper which not only takes a stand on a particular issue but also offers imperative data to back the stand. Additionally, the military leadership is likely to enter a well-developed program to accomplish the recommended objective.

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[7] Samuel P. Huntington, "Strategic Planning and the Political Process," op. cit., p. 137.

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Thus far, the discussion has primarily pertained to means of influencing the course of national policy in a more or less positive manner. Aside from the bargaining stage, there is little legitimate action open to the military leader who wishes to oppose actively the Administration's national security policy. In fact, the dramatic gesture, resignation, is about the only effective means at the military's disposal. The choice of resignation in itself cannot influence policy; however, resignation in protest assures press coverage and a chance to reopen debate. Also, the retired officer may further his protest and opposition through books, articles, and speeches which may influence future policy. While many well-known military leaders have chosen this course rather than submitting to the Administration's policy, few have been as successful as General Taylor who was to be returned to active duty as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to initiate the policy for which he fought while Army Chief of Staff.

Quasi-Legitimate Means of Influence

Military efforts to influence policy which are neither clearly legitimate nor illegitimate fall within this area. They include the shades of gray which ultimately resolve themselves as right or wrong simply on the basis of

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York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), p. 168.

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[10]: Hoopes, and Brotzman, 1973], p. 129.

results. The primary means of influence which most often fall under this category are personal contact, the fait accompli, Congressional lobbying, and propaganda.

The trusted adviser plays a significant role in the national security policy process. The man who has the President's ear is neither restricted by the compromising capability of the National Security Council nor other policy coordination process nor politically nor legally responsible for his advice. In the case of military personal contact, the vertical security hierarchy is clearly circumvented and the adviser may function without a full knowledge of all strategic and political factors involved. There are clear indications that much of the Eisenhower Administration's basic military strategy was formed on the advice of Admiral Arthur W. Radford when the latter was Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and met with the incoming President aboard the cruiser Helena.[9]

Another case of the personal contact was exemplified by the nuclear submarine controversy and the relationship of Captain, and later Admiral, Rickover with Congress. In this instance, Rickover, although opposed by the Navy leadership and the Administration, successfully engineered

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[9]Robert J. Donovan, Eisenhower, The Inside Story (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1956), pp. 17-18.

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a drastic change in military strategy by his personal efforts and Congressional contacts. The uniqueness of the situation was described by Raymond:

> In 1948 Rickover managed a coup that put him in a remarkable position to carry the project /nuclear submarines/ forward. He was placed in charge of the AEC's nuclear reactors branch. He had two hats--one at the Navy and one at the AEC and could, and did, write letters to himself, answer them immediately and get an "agreement" for the official record.[10]

Personal contact is an area of military influence which cannot be regulated closely. The activity is traditionally recognized as political expediency, and it is seldom the adviser who implements the effort for a favored position. Speaking of the phenomenon of expertise, Colonel George A. Lincoln, Professor of Social Science at West Point, stated that "no one has a right to be the 'trusted advisor.'" He further explained that it was a privilege earned by proving that a particular viewpoint merited attention and then the adviser would be sought out by the civilian leadership.[11] However, regardless of where the effort of personal contact originates, the fact that the

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[10]Jack Raymond, Power at the Pentagon (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), p. 230.

[11]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearing before its Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., June 25, 1964 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1964), p. 540. Hereafter referred to as Administration of National Security, Hearing.

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means are outside the organization charged with being the principal advisers to the President and Secretary of Defense clearly reflects a degree of illegitimacy.

The fait accompli as a means of influencing policy is sometimes unavoidable. This circumstance is reflected in one sense by the action of the policy implementor who has to make a policy decision without recourse to high-level guidance. This situation does not reflect an attempt to influence policy and, therefore, will not be considered. The situation of concern is the area where policy is not clear and personal interpretation is utilized for actions. On several occasions during the Korean War General MacArthur initiated actions which were contrary to Washington's policy in such a way that it had an adverse effect on the nation's diplomatic relations. In such cases as his visit to Formosa and the positioning of American troops near the Yalu, there was little that the Administration could do after the fact but attempt to nullify the effects of his actions.[12]

The fait accompli is not a popular means of exerting military influence because the average military leader does not possess the prestige of a MacArthur. Acts calculated

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[12]Richard H. Rovere and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President (New York: Farrar, Straus and Young, 1951), pp. 126-127 and 150-151.

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to influence policy adversely are sufficient reason for immediate dismissal. However, acts which gain a favorable public reaction or which find support within the Administration seldom hurt the professional position of the officer who commits it.

The area of propaganda encompasses many acts of legitimacy, quasi-legitimacy and illegitimacy. The various shades of public relations and information activities make analysis extremely difficult. The legitimacy of building a public image receptive to recruitment of a high caliber officer corps cannot be denied. But the extent of the same activities become suspect if the goal is to oppose the Administration's policy. Propaganda, in the latter sense, was more prevalent and less subtle during the unification conflict. However, it still exists in the form of news leaks and the more frequently utilized public information programs of the various services. Requests for speakers can always turn up ranking officers willing to speak on "Sea Power," "Air Power," or the "role of the foot soldier." Newspaper interviews can also be slanted or biased toward certain policies without overtly opposing existing policy. Concerted efforts in the propaganda area frequently call for policy debates either in Congress of the Administration.

Illegitimate Means of Influence

Illegitimate military efforts to influence national policy include active and official opposition to formulated policies, indirect political pressure, and the use of unethical practices to obtain military goals. In most cases, these practices are enjoined only when other avenues of policy influence are closed. The result of flagrant utilization of illegitimate means inevitably places the military under attack by arousing public opinion or the Administration's ire.

Direct opposition to formulated policy places the military in or on the fringes of the political arena. General MacArthur opposed the Truman Administration's policy in Korea by criticism in press releases and statements which he allowed to be used by Congressmen and private organizations.[13] While the General's political ambitions have been cited as part of the reason that he chose to oppose vocally the Administration, there is every reason to believe that he simply placed himself above the system and that his political aspirations were only a secondary motivation for his actions.

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[13]Rovere, op. cit., pp. 152-153; and Varin E. Whan, Jr. (ed.), A Soldier Speaks, Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1965), pp. 233-234.

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[12] Rovere, op. cit., pp. 232-233; and Darin E. Hinsley (ed.), A Soldier Speaks, Public Papers and Speeches of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965), pp. 233-234.

Other examples of direct opposition generally utilized the means of the news leak or direct liaison with Congressmen who shared their opposition. Kaufmann noted the fact that "military leaders had a disconcerting habit of allowing Congress to learn that particular decisions had been made over their opposition or without their support."[14] Other observers have noted the same phenomenon and military testimony before Congressional Committees generally bear out their observations.

Indirect political pressure is the underlying theme of those who fear an industrial-military clique. Part of this concern is undoubtedly based on the fact that military and industrial contractors have a similar interest in large defense budgets. The military leadership certainly desires to procure the best capabilities to meet any contingency, and the profits of the defense industry depend upon the fat contracts for weapons and systems which unrestricted spending generates. There can be little doubt that, at times, the pressures for certain weapon systems have appeared to be coordinated between industry and the military. In such cases, Congressmen known to be friendly to particular defense contractors have pushed specific procurement at the

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[14]William W. Kaufmann, The McNamara Strategy (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964), pp. 19-20.

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[14] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, p. 13-10.

same time that military leaders have made similar requests through the budgetary process. Thus, the appearance of a new drive by the Air Force for a continuing role for the manned bomber, specifically the AMSA which may be able to support nuclear propulsion, coincides with industry's call for re-examination of the nuclear-powered manned aircraft.[15]

Another alleged method of sustaining the military-industrial coalition has been the Pentagon's interest in munition sales. The charge has been made that the sale of munitions by the Pentagon have been maintained at about 1.6 billion dollars annually even though the avowed policy of the Administration is to slow the traffic in arms to underdeveloped nations which are not faced with an outside threat.[16] The facts in this case have been slanted somewhat to increase readability and interest; however, sufficient military activity in the sale of arms exists to keep the possibility of a military-industrial collusion alive.

Previous discussion has indicated that the military services, collectively and individually, have corporate interests which affect national security policy. Some of the means through which the military pursue their corporate interests were noted in the discussions on the subject in

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[15]Article in The Washington Post, February 3, 1967.

[16]Article in The Washington Post, February 20, 1967.

[illegible] the Pentagon's interest in [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

Chapters II and III. Generally, the overt efforts of the military in this area pertain to items such as pay, retirement, medical care, housing, and other group interests similar to those held by labor or business groups. Efforts exerted in these cases run to Congressional lobbying, attempts to align support from business, labor, and veteran groups, and other standard public opinion molding devices. Efforts in these areas have generally been accepted as legitimate because they are traditional political devices of interest groups. However, when similar efforts are expended to affect policy in a more direct manner, the legitimacy of the means are suspect.

Most corporate interest efforts to affect national policy may be traced to Congressional lobbying, interservice compromise, interservice conflict, and compromise between the Administration and the military leadership. The legitimate and quasi-legitimate aspects of these various situations have already been discussed. Illegitimate means employed by the various services were apparent in the coverage of the unification conflict. Therefore, only the cloudy issues involving lobbying and vertical compromise will be noted.

The military's relationship with Congress is a necessary part of the security policy process so long as the intercourse remains within proper limits. The military

Chapters II and III. Generally, this arena reflects the military in this area pertain to issues such as "job, retirement, medical care, housing," and other group interests similar to those held by labor or business groups. Efforts asserted in these areas can be Compressional Lobbying, attempts to align support from business, labor, and veterans groups, and other standard public opinion molding devices. Efforts in these areas have generally been accepted as legitimate because they are traditional political overlays of interest groups. However, when similar efforts are expanded to affect policy in a more direct manner, the legitimacy of the means are suspect.

Most corporate interest efforts to affect national policy may be termed Compressional Lobbying, because service components, interservice conflict, and compromise between the Administration and the military leadership. The legitimate and quasi-legitimate aspects of these various situations have already been discussed. Illegitimate means employed by the various services were apparent in the coverage of the unification conflict. Therefore, only the cloudy issues involving lobbying and vertical compromise will be noted.

The military's relationship with Congress is a comparatively part of the security policy process so long as the interconnections remains within broad limits. The military

must brief Congress on capabilities and limitation of United States and foreign military power. Yet, many of the efforts exerted by the military are designed to win "friends" and supporters for the individual service's policies. Since Congress must remain unbiased and authorize appropriations for the total military effort, unduly biased "friends" do not benefit national security. Thus, the means involved in gaining general support for a service's policies must be considered illegitimate.

Some of the means which are employed in illegitimate lobbying include use of public funds and material to influence Congressmen favorably, collusion between committee members and military witnesses during hearings, and providing Congressmen with materials to oppose the Administration's policy. Military pampering of Congressmen is a traditional and unfortunately necessary device of lobbying. An anonymous Military Legislative Officer described its effectiveness as follows:

> I don't care how obstreperous a Congressman is toward a certain piece of legislation. If I once get him on a junket, I figure the odds have begun to shift in our favor. Our lobbying effectiveness is at its height, not here on Capitol Hill, but in the field, where we get the Congressman to "see for themselves."[17]

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[17] Raymond, op. cit., p. 189.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

There are certainly enough Congressmen who can be classified as "Navy," "Army," or "Air Force" to bear out the effectiveness of military lobbying. In fact, one might even make the observation that military efforts to gain "friends" in Congress have been so successful that members of the important Armed Services Committees nearly divide among the three services. Therefore, no particular service has gained a predominant position, but the military voice has been assured a hearing.

Previous mention was made of vertical bargaining as a legitimate means of exerting military influence. However, the legitimacy of the process becomes suspect when the bargaining position is used to pursue corporate interest at the expense of national security. This aspect of vertical bargaining is difficult to substantiate; however, it would appear that, at times, the need for military support has caused the Administration to change its stance toward a particular service's policy. In at least one case, the so-called "revolt of the admirals," the military means was coercion in its less subtle form. Other evidence indicates that even in the age of McNamara control a certain amount of coercion still exists. The basis for such an observation rests on the inconsistency of the McNamara approach, Programmed Forces or Systems Analysis, and the budgets of the various forces over the four-year period 1961-1965. In the

McNamara approach to the military budget, the amounts derived for the individual services depend upon their requirements to carry out functions in a balanced strategic system.[18] However, even with changes in strategic concepts which would tend to disrupt the relative proportion of the overall budget division, the relative amounts of defense funds being awarded each service has remained almost static, with less than 2 per cent differences occurring over the 1961-1965 time period.[19]

Before categorizing military means of influence, care was taken to qualify that legitimacy or illegitimacy did not imply right or wrong. The means utilized by the military are, in the long run, judged on the basis of results evaluated in the light of history. This fact can be attested by the cases of military men who have been severely disciplined for utilizing illegitimate means to influence policy only to have future generations exonerate their actions. The court martial of Billy Mitchell is one of the more famous cases which illustrates that legitimacy and perceptiveness are not always synonymous.

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[18] Charles J. Hitch, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System," American Defense Policy, op. cit., pp. 212-215.

[19] United States Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara Before the House Armed Services Committee on Fiscal Year 1965-69 Defense Program and the 1965 Budget, January 27, 1964, p. 162. (Mimeographed.)

[illegible] Hitch, "Planning-Programming-Budgeting System," American Defense Policy, pp. cit., pp. 312-313.

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Another qualification should be that the utilization of other than legitimate means to exert influence may be in reaction to political controls beyond those explicitly or implicitly imposed by law or tradition. In this category must be placed the use of military prestige to legitimate the Administration's policy. This aspect of military influence is particularly significant when the deliberate impression is projected that the policy in question has been evaluated on the basis of military expertise with resulting approval. General Gavin thought that using the military to legitimate policy was "fraught with dangers" and indicated that the practice was not rare during his service as Army Chief of Staff.[20] Other writers, both military and civilian, have commented on the problem without offering a practical solution within the existing system.

Another factor which has reaction probabilities is the emergence of the Department of Defense as a rival or competitor of the military departments in most areas of military policy. This development takes on special significance in the era of decision making on the basis of cost effectiveness. In order to justify their positions and capability requests, the services must present studies in support of their existing policies or policy proposals.

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[20] Taylor, op. cit., p. 160.

Yet, the parameters and assumptions are imposed or limited by the Department of Defense; therefore, the results of the study may be manipulated at the outset. Another means used by the Department of Defense to control legitimate military influence is to reject undesired study results as incomplete or inconclusive and order that the problem be restudied. The study process is necessarily time consuming and the order to re-evaluate effectively postpones any supported request until the following year's budget.

The Department of Defense has its own publicity machinery and links with Congress. The Office of the Secretary of Defense can officially mute military criticism and also combat some of the less subtle acts of policy opposition. Because of the increased control exercised by the present Secretary, military influence has decreased except in those areas where their policy positions are strongly supported by other institutions in government--Department of State, Congress, or the Administration itself.

## II. AN APPROPRIATE MILITARY ROLE

> Once military participation *per se* is accepted as necessary to more effective policy-making, it would then seem to become a question of establishing appropriate limits and conditions for it, in terms of those values or criteria that seem to have general acceptance in society.[21]

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[21]Burton Sapin *et al.*, *An Appropriate Role for the*

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## IV. AN APPROPRIATE MILITARY ROLE

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Although the preceding statement was directed toward the military's role in foreign policy, it is equally applicable to the broader scope of national security policy. But, the task of determining an appropriate military role is extremely complex. The difficulties involved in discovering overall limitations are both numerous and interdependent. Because of the intricacies involved, role determination has generally been attempted on the basis of micro-analysis. Thus, Congress concerns itself with structuring a security organization, and scholars study the military's influence in foreign policy, economic policy, political activities, or a score of others pertinent to military influence.

The micro-analysis approach appears to have serious deficiencies. While such studies seem to strive for objectivity and reliability, the results lose much of their validity or even become meaningless when considering the problem as a whole. This failure of micro-analysis is probably caused by the loss of inter-relationships and conflicting objectives which can be easily experienced when dealing with the apparent significance of any given facet of the military role. Thus, one study criticizes the Joint

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Chiefs because they have tended to be insulated from civilian control because of organizational structure and intellectual inability to take successful issue with their judgments.[22] On the same subject, another authoritative source finds that the Joint Chiefs must inevitably be more influenced by the attitudes and behavior of the policy-makers and statesmen than by any other source.[23] Numerous other examples of diverse conclusions exist on the same, or similar, phenomenon approached from a different facet of the military role.

The implications of national security policy demand that all participants in the policy process function effectively and efficiently. The scope of participants' influence can only be limited legitimately by the criteria of democracy and societal values. Therefore, in the determination of an appropriate military role, the overall effect of military influence should be considered rather than attacking the problem in a piece-meal fashion. This does not mean that specific areas should not be studied; however, proposed limitations and role determinations must be

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[22] Burton M. Sapin and Richard C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1954), p. 29.

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Chiefs because they have tended to be insulated from civilian control because of organizational structure and technical inability to take successful issue with their judgments.[22] On the same subject, another authority points out that the views of the Joint Chiefs must inevitably be more influenced by the attitudes and behavior of the policymakers and statesmen than by any other sources.[23] Numerous other examples of diverse conclusions exist on the same, or similar, phenomenon approached from a different facet of the military role.

The implications of neglecting security policy issues that all participants in the policy process function effectively and efficiently. The scope of participants' influence can only be limited logistically by the criteria of competency and societal values. Therefore, in the determination of an appropriate military role, the overall effect of military influence should be considered rather than attempting the problem in a piece-meal fashion. This does not mean that specific areas should not be studied; however, proposed limitations and role determinations must be

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constantly applied to the overall goals of national security and democracy. And, because these goals are not always compatible, some degree of compromise must sometimes be considered necessary.

Problems of a Limiting Parameter

The derivation of an appropriate military role involves the proper balancing of variables within the overall framework of the national security process. Determination of limitations must consider the interdependency of politico-military matters, civilian-military expertise, definitive range of military responsibilities, and the dangers of either submissiveness or arrogance. The inherent conflict of role reactions among policy participants can only be corrected by recognizing and lessening the causes of competition and hostility.

As mentioned in Chapter II, distrust, antagonism, and irritation between civilian and military groups are detrimental to the effectiveness and efficiency of policy-making. There was a time that these adverse factors were relatively unimportant to national security. However, the interdependency of political and military matters now dictate that the two groups work together in harmony and mutual respect. As Huntington points out:

> The ordering of its civil military relations . . . is basic to a nation's military security policy.

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The ordering of its civil-military relations . . .

> The objective of this policy on the institutional level is to develop a system of civil-military relations which will maximize military security at the least sacrifice of other social values. The achievement of this objective involves a complex balancing of power and attitudes among civilian and military groups. Nations which develop a properly balanced pattern of civil-military relations have a great advantage in the search for security. They increase their likelihood of reaching right answers to the operating issues of military policy. Nations which fail to develop a balanced pattern of civil-military relations squander their resources and run uncalculated risks.[24]

The institutionalizing of a national security hierarchy by the "National Security Act of 1947" and amendments to the Act was an attempt to "order" the nation's civil-military relations properly. Although successful to some degree, efforts to solve the problems of military-political interdependency solely through legislative organization is bound to fall short in some respects. While effective hierarchal structure may be formulated, legislation cannot provide the staffing nor the will to make the organization function as planned. Additionally, all aspects of national security policy have not centralized in the organs envisioned by Congressional efforts. While Congress structured a hierarchy, other government agencies were evolving and creating lateral dispersion of influence and responsibility. Huntington noted this aspect of the security policy process when he pointed out that members of the Executive Office

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have responsibilities which disrupt or supplement those of the Defense and State Departments.[25] Stanley perceived the importance of the Treasury and Commerce Departments in policy making and coordination, and also recognized the significance of the Office of Defense Mobilization, various coordinating committees and the Committee on Government Organization.[26] Any list of governmental bodies which increase the conflict potential in civil-military relations should include Congress, especially the Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Policy Committees.

The range of interested parties in the policy-making process suggests that limitations on a single participant's role will invariably strengthen the influence of another sector. Therefore, one of the major problems which must be considered when limiting the military's influence is the determination if another agency can more effectively perform the function. Also, assuming that proper limitations can be determined for the military participation in the policy process, attention must be directed toward protecting those functions left to the military. Otherwise more powerful elements in the process will further erode military influence in their own search for a broader role.

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[25] Ibid., p. 18.

[26] Stanley, op. cit., p. 16.

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Even if clear-cut and binding limitations are successfully placed on military influence, the problem of coordination and limitation will still exist. That part of the problem which rests on personal attitudes--mutual distrust and lack of respect--can be alleviated by more intensive efforts at cross education. The exchange program of officers between State and Defense apparently has had success in this area although limited by numbers.[27] However, if this and other programs, such as the civilian enrollment at service colleges, are expanded sufficiently to be widely effective, the problem of the "military mind" may take on a more significant relevance than it presently possesses. Such a situation could downgrade the validity of military advice and recommendation more radically than structural limitations on influence.

Improvement in the civilian leadership's understanding of military matters is one of the foremost requirements of strengthening the concept of civilian supremacy as well as contributing more effectively to the security of the nation. Yet, an apparent solution, such as the requirement that the Deputy Secretary of Defense or the Assistant Secretaries of Defense be career civil servants rather than political appointees, loses much of its validity when

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[27] Administration of National Security, Hearing, op. cit., pp. 597-600.

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[24] Communication of Technical Knowledge, Hearing, op. cit., pp. 197-220.

approached in the overall search for effective national policy making. While the proposal solves the problems of expertise and continuity at the lower level, the arrangement would be counter to the tradition of political responsibility for policy makers as well as limiting the power of the Secretary of Defense.

Another problem area which must be evaluated when limiting the military role involves the clarification of military responsibilities. This area is filled with latent possibilities and dangers. Can the decision be made that military responsibility stops when superiors in the hierarchy have been informed or advised? In an era of extreme military-political interdependency, can the military responsibility be relegated to pure capability analysis? Where is the line to be drawn which separates military responsibility from political responsibility? And a dozen other equally pertinent questions must be evaluated in the overall context of national security requirements rather than the more narrow confines of civilian supremacy, legitimacy, expertise, etc.

One important factor in clarifying military responsibility is the firmness and clarity of the national policy provided the military leadership. Kintner criticizes national policy on the ground that it provides inadequate guidelines due to its broadness and general character. He

finds that such policy gives little direction for military planning and operation in the total scheme.[28] The argument is valid from the viewpoint of clarifying military responsibility, but the articulation of concrete and detailed national goals and policies lends a dogmatic inflexibility to national strategy.

Another situation which must be considered is the degree of responsibility which the military must assume for the Administration's policy. This area is the center of controversy over utilizing the military to legitimate policy which they oppose and the means used by the military to make their opposition known. That civilian leadership cannot abide public opposition from military subordinates is the most effective argument for a broad military responsibility to support Administration policies. In the narrow context of clarifying responsibilities, this concept is unassailable; however, public opposition has frequently resulted in policy alterations which improve the overall national security posture. "Muzzling" of military opinion and denial of other means of military influence might also lead to the type of military professionalism which thrives on indecisiveness and political intrigue.

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[28] William R. Kintner, "The Politicalization of Strategy," National Security, ed. David M. Abshire (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publisher, 1963), p. 395.

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[58] Millis, H. Bruner, "The Military Dimension of Strategy," National Security, ed. David M. Abshire (New York: Praeger for the Atlantic Council, 1963), p. 105.

Too much emphasis on civilian supremacy and an exacting national security hierarchy may also permeate the military establishment with an attitude of submissiveness. This "danger" would affect the direction of national security policy because of its effect on military capability. Efforts of the various service leaders to maintain military readiness for implementation of national policies as well as war contingencies comprise a vast majority of the conflicts between the military and civilian leadership. Much of the controversy over role limitation has been based on a need to lessen debate and conflict within the national policy process. Unification has been the plan most often advanced because complete integration would provide unitary control and better discipline of a smaller military leadership. Yet, even the strongest advocates of civilian control have seen some disadvantages in this course of action. In addition to the ever present possibility that true unification might create greater rather than less military influence and participation in national policy, many recognize the divergent interests of the three services as a source of new ideas and a sounding board for ideas among the services.

While the clamor is occasionally raised for an increase in discipline to control military influence and means of influence, there is a danger that too much

discipline may encourage the "yes man" hazard. If Huntington's observation that "rigid and inflexible obedience may well stifle new ideas and become slave to an unprogressive routine," is generally applicable to military service, the danger of unification may well be the gradual degradation of military strength and loss of policy flexibility.[29]

Of equal importance when considering the role of the military is the danger of the 'Man on Horseback.' This aspect ties in closely with preservation of the civilian supremacy concept, but differentiation can be made on the basis of degree and method. For instance, the military leadership could gain a preponderance of power without destroying the facade of civilian control. This result could be achieved by providing advice in the form of a single alternative; military control of the civilian leadership; and, creeping militarism as a result of civilian leadership becoming military in spirit and attitude.[30] Even though charges are occasionally made that this point has already been reached or that national militarism is imminent, factual evidence to support the allegations refer to isolated cases rather than general conditions. Yet the importance of basic limitations on the military role imposed

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[29] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 75.

[30] Sapin and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 55-56.

disciplines may contravene the "iron mean" hypothesis. If Huntington's observation that "style and intrinsic obsolescence may well settle new issues and become aliens to an interpretative routine," is generally applicable to military service, the danger of unification may well be the gradual degradation of military strength and less--a policy bluntness.[19]

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[19] Huntington, The Soldier and the State, op. cit., p. 73.

[20] Ralph and Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 33-36.

by democracy, as well as security, demands that all solutions to national security policy problems be evaluated in the light of possible or potential long-run effects as well as obvious short-run implications. The danger of military intervention in political affairs appears extremely unlikely; however, the position of power held by the military leadership at the end of World War II definitely indicates that military intervention would not be an impossible event if radically different circumstances and attitudes should prevail.

Necessary Factors for Limiting Influence

The most significant limitations imposed on military influence have been Congressional efforts to structure the policy process and Executive or statutory provisions restricting legitimate military means of influence. These limitations have not resulted in the harmony, effectiveness, and efficiency initially expected. In fact, the combined efforts of Congress and the Administration have not approached in significance the self-imposed military restrictions founded in tradition and military indoctrination. This is not to imply that Congressional or hierarchal restrictions were not necessary, but rather that these measures were treatments of symptoms instead of causal alleviation.

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A smooth and efficient organization is a definite asset to policy formulation and implementation. However, any organization is only as effective as the people who are responsible for its functioning. Therein rests one of the prime considerations to effective and reasonable limitations to military influence in the policy process. No degree of legal restriction is apt to limit military participation in areas which its leadership considers vital to the preservation of national security unless those areas have competent and vigorous civilian leadership. Approaching the subject from another direction, John J. McCloy substantiated the military's refusal to leave an inadequately covered policy area to chance:

> Above all we must have officials in the State Department who have political vision and the ability to foresee and act upon vital world problems. They must have the capacity to develop long range programs for our security and that of the free world. Though they must have a full realization of the limitations which military and economic considerations impose, they must have courage, initiative and force in the political field . . . . They must be prepared to put forward creative proposals and they must not fold up at the first negative paper which emanates from the Pentagon, however formidable it is presented.[31]

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best people into key foreign policy and defense posts" as the heart of national security.[32] Yet, even though the lack of civilian leadership has been recognized and some improvements instituted, the general consensus remains that the government will never solve the problem until the many barriers to recruitment of superior talent are lowered.

Improvement in civilian leadership alone will not drastically limit military influence. The military leadership must exert a vigorous control over their hierarchies as well as exhibiting a willingness to take issue on a confidential basis with their civilian superiors. General Marshall's philosophy that the military leadership must set the example for their services by complete loyalty to the Administration's policy expresses the most effective type of influence limitation.[33] Complete acceptance of General Marshall's attitude would substantially reduce all but the most legitimate means of military influence. However, the

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[32]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organizing for National Security, Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman of its Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., November 15, 1961, Committee Print (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 139.

[33]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security: Selected Papers, Prepared by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 139.

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[33]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Administration of National Security, Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 21, 81st Cong., 1st sess., (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1949), p. 134.

desirability of initiating such a system ultimately rests with its effect on national security, and that effect would undoubtedly be detrimental unless complementary factors of influence limitation are simultaneously initiated.

The most important supplement to a different military attitude must be a legitimate means of policy influence which can be divorced from partisan politics, political expediency, and bureaucratic controls. General Taylor's proposal for a separate and independent Supreme Military Council meets part of these requirements.[34] But further refinements would be necessary in order to insure that the remaining hierarchy was not subjected to Administration pressures in the form of legitimating policy or debating with the independent council. Since the council would have a role of policy review, recommendation, and advice, and would be comprised of officers totally divorced from their military services, they could legally and ethically support, oppose, or propose modifications to national security policy on the basis of military expertise alone. The problems associated with such a plan are numerous; but when coupled with a purely professionally-oriented military hierarchy, the potential benefits for national security are most attractive.

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[34]Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York: Harper and Brothers, Publishers, 1960), pp. 176-177.

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There has been a degree of correlation between influence means and limitations since World War II. The limitations which have been imposed have been generally proportional to the decrease in legitimate means through which the military voice could be heard. At the same time, the number of quasi-legitimate and illegitimate means of influence have increased as well as an increased utilization of various improper means. The most significant potential danger from the trend is that too many structural and legal influence limitations may force the military to become more involved in the political arena in order to contribute to the national security policy process.

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# CHAPTER VI

## CONCLUSIONS

Any objective study of the military role in national security will reveal the ambiguous and paradoxical nature of military influence. The military group, perhaps more than any other participant in the security policy process, has gained the distinction of being "damned if they do, damned if they don't." Some critics of military influence argue that the military should concern itself with purely military matters; while others lament the fact that military decisions give insufficient attention to political aspects. Military policy makers find themselves simultaneously charged with being too aggressive and too cautious, poorly organized and highly organized, and possessing many other equally contradictory attributes.

The strangest part of the contradiction is that each charge and each criticism, regardless of sides taken, appear to have enough validity to sustain a reasonable argument. Therefore, the overall conclusion of this study is that national values regarding military influence are fragmented and ambiguous, and this condition leads to an indecisive determination of the degrees of military influence which society will tolerate. However, general parameters for military involvement are fairly well formulated by the

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The strangest part of the contradiction is that each charge and each criticism, regardless of sides taken, appear to have enough validity to sustain a reasonable argument. Therefore, the overall conclusion of this study is that national values regarding military influence are burdensome and ambiguous, and this condition leads to an ineffective and inefficient use of the degree of military influence which society will tolerate. However, general parameters for military involvements are fairly well determined by the

broad concepts of democratic government and the requirements for military security. Since these primary limiting factors are not compatible and military influence is, in a sense, a relative quantity, different interpretations of the degree of military influence reflected in national policy become not only possible but entirely probable.

It becomes obvious from the study that the traditional civilian-military relationship has gradually evolved toward a better understanding; however, the condition of mutual trust has not been fully attained. Civilian leaders in the government no longer fear military usurpation of political power, but a certain degree of uneasiness is still exhibited over the so-called "military mind." At the same time, considerable evidence supports the conclusion that the military's antagonism toward the civilian leadership in the Office of the Department of Defense has increased during the period of that organization's ascendancy to firmer control over the military. The nature of national security policy formulation and implementation with its heavy reliance on cooperation and coordination indicates that the process would benefit by any improvement in relationships of the participants. Therefore, the concept of the military mind should be explored and reconstructed on the basis of fact rather than random interpretation, and a solution to the problems of civilian expertise versus

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military expertise in military matters should be determined within the Department of Defense.

The latter problem is only one of many relating to aspects of the National Security Organization. Past efforts at improving security through structure undoubtedly have aided the formulation and coordination of national policy; however, the relative ease with which the system can be circumscribed definitely indicates that organizational reforms are insufficient in themselves to insure proper balancing of participants' influence. This, in turn, leads to the recognition that role determination for all members of the security policy team must not only be enumerated but must also be adhered to in practice. Only through appropriate role determination can the military attitude be changed because it requires recognition and restraint on the part of non-military leaders as well as by the generals and admirals.

Conclusions concerning the degree of military involvement in national policy can only be described as extensive. As previously mentioned, judgment as to whether there is too much, too little, or the correct amount is a purely subjective exercise. Relatively speaking, one could conclude that military influence has increased drastically beyond that exerted prior to World War II or that the influence of the military today is significantly less than that

held during World War II. However, it would appear that military influence has become somewhat imbalanced, tending to decrease in the area of strategic planning and capability analysis while proportionally increasing in the areas of politico-military affairs, policy representation and coordination, and social and economic impact.

It is impossible to determine the exact degree to which military influence has affected national policy since World War II. Although the economic costs of military expenditures during the same period are staggering to the mind's comprehension, one fact stands out: the nation's security interests, as embodied in the national policies of four successive Administrations, have been generally successful, and the influence exerted by the military leadership has contributed substantially to that success. National policy making is a complex and intricate process in which the influence of participants vary according to time and events; therefore, the degree of influence of particular groups must be considered in light of goals, objectives and results, and the evaluations should seek an overall perspective.

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